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CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENTS III SHIPPING AND LAWS PERTAINING TO IT
FROM 1789-1812
In 1789—July 4th to be exact—the government of the
United St&tes began an attempt to stimulate tne Atlantic trade
by passing the first law on the subject of fishing. Fishing
is not to be classified with shipping and yet both are in a
slight manner correlated and the attempt to aid fishing also
aided shipping as we notice when reading the provisions of
the law. The Act of July 4th stimulated shipping by allowing
a reduction of one tenth of the Custom duties on goods imported
in vessels built and owned by American citizens. On July 20
another statute was passed providing that importations of tea
in vessels similarly owned should pay 50 to 60 per cent less
than importations in foreign bottoms. Thus, a Salem vessel
with a cargo of 100,000 pounds of tea would pay $10,980 while
a British ship with the same cargo would pay &27,800 in duties.
Tne East India trade was fostered because tea in an American
vessel, according to Paine, was taxed twelve cents a pound,
while tea in foreign vessels was taxed twenty-seven cents a
pound. ^ Another provision of the above Act further provided
a scale of increased duties on tea importations in American
vessels entering from countries other than those in which the
cargo originated, tnus making it cheaper to import teas in
1. Paine, Ralph D. The Old Merchant Marine. Chronicles of
America Series. Allan Johnson, Editor. New Haven 1921.
Yale University Press, p. 96-y?
2. Meloney, Wm. B. The Heritage of Tyre. Hew York 1916.
Macmillan p. 22
3. Paine. Old Merchant Marine, o. 96-97
•(
(
American ships directly from India and China on the other side
of the world than from London just across the Atlantic. 1 To
strengthen still more the above laws a third statute was
passed providing (a) that American-built vessels owned by-
foreigners should pay 30 cents a ton; (b) that American vessels
both built and owned abroad should pay 50 cents a ton; (c) that
American-built vessels of American ownership should pay tonnage
duties of 6 cents a. ton; (d) that American vessels wholly en-
gaged in tne coastal trade should pay only a single entry a
year and that an alien should pay tne tax as many times as he
entered the port. Congress proceeded to do even more for it
now granted a bounty of $1.50 to all deep-sea fishermen over
twenty tons. Likewise in 1792 the laws were amended to add a
10 per cent tax over and above the regular customs on all im-
portations under foreign flags.
3
The results of all these laws and statutes are shown
by the following figures. 4 On December 31, 1789 the United
States had 123,893 tons of shipping in deep-water commerce
which carried 17 per cent of the country's imports and 30 per
cent of its exports. On December 31, 1794, this fleet had
increased to 438,863 tons which carried 91 per cent of the
imparts and 86 per cent of the exports. On December 31, 1796,
the tonnage had increased to 576,733 and American bottoms were
transporting 94 per cent of the imports and 90 per cent of the
exports. The war between England and France in 1793 was dis-
astrous to American shipping, but Jay's treaty in 1794 opened ths
1. Meloney. Heritage of Tyre, p. 22
2. Ibid. P. 23
3. Ibid. p. 24
4. Ibid. p. 24
II
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3East Indies trade, although it also resulted in the complete
freedom of trade for British shipping in American ports and
did nothing about the right of search and impressment.-^- The
treaty of Amiens signed in 1802 caused the carrying trade to
diminish for a time but soon with war renewed there came a
resultant boom in American trade which resulted until the adven -
of the Orders in Council, Milan and Berlin decrees and the Em-
bargo. Trade boomed because the United States was the only
neutral country.
Trade with the West Indies alone increased from
|2,144,000 in 1792 to $9,700,000 in 1801. 2 From 1796 through
1807 the value of domestic exports equalled $464,319,377
while the value of foreign exports was #476,273 ,051 3 while
the total value of imports equalled $138,500,000 in 1807.
The domestic exports and foreign exports in 1807 alone equalled
$108,343,150 in value according to Bishop in his History of
Manufactures. The domestic exports equalled $48,699,592 in
value and the value of the foreign exports equalled $59,643,558,
The position of neutrality was beneficial because
all of the colonial possessions of France, Spain, England, and
Holland were opened to a neutral flag and the products—sugar,
spices, coffee, etc., found their way to Europe in American
4
ships. In 1805 Great Britain resumed the Rule of 1756 which
stated that neutrals in time of war could carry on no trade
which they had not been accustomed to carry on in time of
peace.
5
1. Paine. Old Merchant Marine, p. 101
2. Adams, James T. , iiew England in the Republic, 1776-1850.
Boston, 1926. Little, brown Company, p. 239.
3. Pitkin, Timothy. A Statistical View of the Commerce of the
United States of America. New Haven, 1835 t>.370
4. Ibid. IS" mips. S96 pages, p. 370 F
5. Ibid. O.370

4The English Revival of the Rule of 1756 was due to
the decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the American
ship Essex, which he found guilty of shipping goods not legally
paying duties—i.e., United States gave a drawback on bills of
lading cost. As a consequence, the American ship-owners
protested vigorously with the exception of the Massachusetts
ship-owners. The attitude of the shipping interests in that
state is well shown by the action of Boston. The town of
Boston sent a memorial to Congress protesting but in a very
moderate tone, saying that caution was necessary and the
government should not protest too vigorously and only appoint
a special mission to aid Monroe who already was in London. 1
As a result a treaty, negotiated by Wm. Pinckney and Monroe,
in 1806 provided that during the war then in progress European
products might be carried to the port of any colony, belonging
to the enemy of Great Britain, provided that they had been
entered and landed in the United States and paid the ordinary
duties; and on re-exportation should, after the drawback, have
been subject to a duty, equivalent to not less than one per-
cent ad valorem and were bona-fide the property of American
citizens. It was also provided that the produce of the colonies
of the enemies, might also be brought to the United States,
there entered, landed, and having paid the duties might be re-
exported, to any part of Europe, subject to a duty after the
draw-back, of not less than 2$ ad valorem. The above treaty,
or provisions of said treaty, was rejected by President
1. Adams, Henry. History of the United States , 9 vol., New York,
1890. Scribners. Vol. S. p. 143 ff.
"m
«
(
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5Jefferson because there was not included an express stipulation
against future impressments. The British Commissioners, how-
ever, had given written assurance to the Americans against the
future abuse of the practice of impressment.
^
On Nov. 21, 1806 Napoleon issued his famous Berlin
decree which established the Continental System declaring that
the British Isles were in a state of blockade and prohibiting
commerce and intercourse with them. To further strengthen the
enforcement of this plan Napoleon stated that all neutral and
commercial countries should join in his commercial war-fare
against Great Britain. 2 As a result he confiscated not only
English vessels, but all neutral vessels that traded with
England. On Nov. 11, 1807 the British Orders in Council were
issued^ stating that all ports and places of France and her
allies, or where the British flag was excluded were to be
placed in a state of blockade by his Majesty's ships and all
trade in articles which were of the produce or manufacture of
the said countries and colonies, should be deemed unlawful, and
any vessel with such produce or manufactures on board should
be confiscated. Napoleon reiterated with his Liilan decree 4
saying that any ship (no matter to what nation it belonged)
that shall have permitted to being searched by an English ship,
or to a voyage to England, or paid any tax whatever to the
British government, shall thereby, and for that alone, be de-
nationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its King,
and to have become English property. Ships which were so de-
nationalized, on entering a port of France, or being captured
1. Pitkin, Statistical View , p. 376
2. Ibid., p. 377-278
3. Ibid., p. 381
4. Ibid.
, p. 381
((
6"by French ships or privateers should be considered lawful
prizes. On Dec. 22, 1807 President Jefferson issued his
Embargo, which lasted for fifteen months and kept all vessels
at home. As a result of this Embargo foreign commerce de-
creased in value in one year from $108,000,000 to $22,000, 000. 1
There are several ways by which we may account for th
$22,000,000; namely, illicit trade with Canada and the West
Indies. Hot only was such illicit trade carried on but the
Federal government also permitted it by the issuing of cer-
tificates which permitted trade to allow the states to obtain
necessary supplies. It is indeed interesting to read about
Gov. Sullivan issuing certificates in Massachusetts and as
a result becoming embroiled in a controversy with Jefferson. 2
England also favored neutreJL ships and allowed them free sail-
ing to British ports. Coasting trade—although closely
supervised was permitted and there were many American-owned
ships in foreign ports when the Embargo went into effect and
these loaded their cargoes and sailed home later. Sears in
his chapter on New England and the Embargo gives us a true
view of conditions there and also gives a fine study of
Jefferson. Jefferson, by nature, was a pacifist and his idea
of the Embargo was that (l) it would safeguard our shipping;
(2) it would bring European consumers to a realization of the
folly of their governments in cutting them off from needed
supplies. ^ At a later date Jefferson believed in war, but
h«s also foresaw that it would nave to be a tri-angular war end
1. Paine, Old Merchant Marine, p. 109
2. Sears. Louis Martin. Jefferson and the Embargo. 1927. Duke
University Press. Durnam, North Carolina, p. 78
3. Ibid.
,
p. 3
r(
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7as a consequence turned to the Embargo when he was advised that
although the people of England wanted war, the manufacturers
did not and would seek to prevent English government from the
use of the decrees. 1 Jefferson's Embargo effected Massachu-
setts as follows:^ the total exports of Massacnusetts dropping
from |30,100,000 in 180? to $5,100,000 in 1808, while the ship-
ping tonnage was 426,000 or about one-fifth of total United
States tonnage. These losses in exports, about 75 per cent,
were almost equally divided between domestic and foreign
products. The tonnage of ship-building constructed in 1808 was
only one-third of that of 1807, while the farmers felt the
effect of the Embargo because of the drop in the demand for
their products. Prices declined—as beans 41 per cent, pota-
toes 23 per cent, corn 55 per cent, while the prices of many
imported necessities and luxuries increased by bounds. The
only redeeming feature of the Embargo was that it protected the
manufacturing interests better than a tariff. John Quincy
Adams favored the Embargo, but only because his fatner had.
advocated it, while Josiah Quincy opposed it because he said
the individual could better protect his own interests than the
government.^ As a result of the paralysis of shipping, the
Embargo Act v/as withdrawn and a Non- Intercourse Act substituted
in 1808. This provided for the suspension of trade with Great
Britain and France until the orders were repealed. 4 Napoleon
strongly opposed the Non- Intercourse Act and ordered all Amer-
ican ships in continental ports under his jurisdiction to be
1. Sears, Jefferson and th e Embargo
.
p.55ff.
2. Adams, j.T., New England "in Republic, p. 251-252
3. Sears, Jefferson and th e Embargo. pTT43ff.
4. Paine, Old Merchant Marine, p. 110

3seized. On May 4, 1809, Napoleon issued his famous Rambouillet<-
deoree ordering that all vessels under the flag of the United
States, which counting from the twentieth of May, 1809, had
entered or should enter into the ports of his Empire, or of
his colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should
"be seized and the products of the sale of the cargoes and
vessels deposited in the surplus fund. It was now a question
as to just how much effect, the various orders, decrees, and
acts had and the United States was vainly trying to make
treaties with either France or England by which all decrees and
orders would be revoked. Finally, on the tenth of May, 1812,
Barlow, the American minister received from Napoleon a copy of
a decree, purported to have passed on the 28th of April, 1811,
in which Napoleon declared "The decrees of Berlin and Milan are
definitively, and to date, from the first day of November last,
considered as not having existed. 2" Napoleon seemed to have
definite assurance that the United States would declare war
against England; unless the orders in Council were repealed.
He was right, for war was declared June 18, five days before
the decrees were repealed. It was highly improbable, however,
that war could have been avoided, for there was a strong mili-
tant party in Congress declaring that impressment could be
prevented only by war. The Committee on Foreign Relations in
January 1813 declared that it considered impressment as the
prime cause of the war. 4 J.T. Adams gives figures showing
that little impressment was done, however^— i.e. a committee
1. Pitkin. Statistical View , p. 389
2. Ibid., x)T~%J3
3. Ibid.
, p. 403
4. Ibid., p. 405
5. Adams, J.T., New England in Republic
, p. 245-246
'I
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9of Massachusetts State Senate said only 157 had been impressed
from the whole state, while people of Salem claimed that more
than that number had been impressed from Salem alone, and thd
United States government claimed over 6,000 American sailors
had been impressed. The whole question resolves into the
United States considering it an injustice and against a right
of personal security, while as Mahan^ points out, England saw
no reason why sne should give up the right of impressment and
search because a new nation decided it should be done, whereas
France and otner old enemies accepted it as a matter of course.
The Federalists of New England were successful in
having the Embargo repealed, and yet in offering non-intercourse
as the alternative they made war a result—for England and
France could get supplies from this country in neutral ships
and also they would capture American ships and subject them to
indignities in their Admiralty courts. The Embargo would have
been a better preventive of war, would have prevented loss
of ships, have kept England and France from getting supplies
and would have served as a real world court if given a true
ptrial of say two to three years.
1. Mahan, Captain Alfred Thayer. Sea Power in its Relation to
War of 1813. Boston, 1819. 2 volumes. Volume 1. p.H4ff.
2. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 195-196

10
CHAPTER II
COMMERCE 1815-1820
TRENDS OF TRADE ArlD PLACES WITH WHICH TRADE WAS CARRIED ON
As Hunt1 says after the cessation of the war, new
vigor was infused into every department of commerce, with the
most emphasis being placed on domestic commerce. This new
vigor came as a result of tne colonization of the new states
of the West, increase of new subjects of cultivation, especially
cotton, the increase of population, plus the establishment of
a compact, well-organized government affording free scope to
national enterprise of all sorts. Al}. these things together
tended to advance agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. The
aid in the development of commerce was due to the growth and
demand of the people for luxuries which had to be imported from
Europe and which drew wealth from the country in the same pro-
portion as it increased our commerce. One is reminded of Mc-
Master's words which have been mentioned before—namely, the
overflow of English goods, tne doing away with of the super-
cargoes, and the inability of most merchants to pay for the huge
supply of goods which they had imported. The growth of manu-
factures and agriculture did aid commerce according to Hunt in
the following ways: 2 Agriculture's relationship to the carrying
trade
—
(a) tne cultivation of cotton, causing it to be used in
large quantities; (b) tne wide development of new lands result-
ing in the growth of wheat and grain, also rice, tobacco, beef
horses, mules, butter and sheep; (c) the development of and
1. Hunt, Merchant Magazine
. vol.V 1841. p. 46
2. Ibid.
,
p. 46

11
deriving- of the products of the forests—i.e. lumber, skins,
furs, dyes, bark, pitch, tar, rosin, turpentine, and ginseng;
(d) many domestic exports were derived from the sea—i.e. whale
and spermaceti, oils and candles, cod, mackerel, herring, shad
and salmon, salted and packed in barrels; (e) last but not
least, cotton and woolen cloths manufactured as a direct result
of the growth of manufactured articles from agricultural produc
Other manufactured articles which were exported include soap
and tallow candles, leather boots and shoes, hats, wax, spirits
from grains— i.e. beer, ale and porter, snuff, tobacco, linseed
oil, cordage, iron, cotton, flax and hemp, umbrellas and mvlass
It is not to be denied that there was an increase in
trade after the war and this increase is reflected somewhat in
the development of several new and interesting enterprises.
For example, Frederick Tudor, a Boston merchant had sent a few
small shipments of ice to the West Indies before the war. Afte
the war he expanded his project and secured as monopoly of the
New England ice tra.de for Havana, and his shipments were ex-
tended to Charleston, Sa/vannah, and New Orleans. Tne ice shrun
greatly in its voyage, yet despite its great loss of size it
sold at high prices and made good profits a.s the demand for it
was great. Tudor 's greatest feat in this shipment of ice was
the sending of a cargo to Calcutta. He carefully packed the
ice and on its arrival in Calcutta it sold like wildfire. As
a result of this sale of ice, a brisk trade arose between Indis
and Boston for ice, which lasted for nearly thirty years and gs|
Boston a monopoly of all traffic in trade. 2 The greatest
ts.
3S. 1
r
k
ve
1. Pitkin, Statistical View p. 139
2. Marvin, w. L. , American Merchant Marine p. 184
i
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revival however was that of the East India trade, and this in a
way really is the story of Salem. It was Cleveland and Delano
who showed the way to the Salem people in the trade with the
far East, and it was the people of Salem who carried on and
completed this trade. As a consequence, let us describe the
East Indies trade by the story of Salem.
Marvin says that in old Salem "well named the city of
peace from its civilizing commerce" the spirit of American
commerce in its adventurous aspects found its highest and
noblest embodiments. The first American vessels to the Cape
of Good Hope sailed from Salem, as did the first vessels to oper1
up trade with Hindustan, Java, Sumatra, and with the aid of the
Dutch Japan. Salem ships were among the first to arrive at
the West Coast of Africa, the Fiji Islands, Madagascar, New
Holland, Hew Zealand, and even South America.^ Salem's Commerce
in 1700 was described as follows by Felt*3 "Dry merchantable
codfish for the markets of Spain and Portugal and the Straits.
Refuse fish, lumber, horses and provisions for tne West Indies;
returns made directly to England are sugar, molasses, cotton,
wool, log-wood and Braeletto wood for which we depend on the
West Indies. Our own produce, a considerable quantity of
whale and fish oil, whalebone, furs, deer, elk, and bear skin,
are annually sent to England. We have much shipping here and
freignts are low." In 1768 Salem had 7,913 tons of shipping;
in 1771, 9,223 tons while during the Revolution tne tonnage
naturally ceased to grow, although under the able leadership
1. Marvin, American Merchant Marine, p. 195
2. Felt, Joseph B. Annals of Salem

-13-
of Elias Hasket Derby, 158 armed vessels were equipped to cruise
against the enemy. In 1791, the tonnage was 9,031 less than
that of 1771, but between the years of 1791 and 1797 the merchai
tonnage increased to 24,862 and at the time Jefferson's Embargo
was put into effect, Salem possessed 252 vessels with a combinec
tonnage of 43, 570. 1 In June, 1784, Derby sent his ship "Lignt
Horse" to St. Petersburg with a load of sugar and as a conse-
quence, one of the essential parts of an East Indies trip was
founded. That is to say, the people of the East Indies did not
desire particularly the home products of the farms, fisheries,
and forests, and as a result ships bound out beyond the Cape of
Good Hope carried as part of their freight European manufacturej
As a consequence the smaller ships— i.e. brigs and barks—col-
lected iron, duck and hemp from Gothenburg, Archangel or Kron-
stadt and also miscellaneous goods from England. This freight
idea was not that as we think of it today—freight was carried
not for others but to carry out the mercantile affairs of the
owners themselves. Thus, an individual merchant would furnish
the ship with an outward freight and this, through its sale in
a foreign port, would procure a homeward cargo which the merchar
would sell from his own ware-house. This procedure needed cleve
men and as a result there originated the "half-lay" or "square-
halves" system. ^ That is the ship-owner or several ship-owners
provided the ship and equipment, while the captain hired the
crew and paid the running expenses. The gain^ if any, was split
between the owners, captains, and crews. If there was no cargo
t
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or freight, the captain and super-cargo were provided with a
large amount of silver "bullion, with which the return cargo
could be bought outright.
As may be expected, voyages which required such
ingenuity and skill resulted in many adventurous and myster-
ious trips for new cargoes. One of the most interesting
voyages was that of Captain Jonathan Carnes. In 1793 while
on a voyage, he heard that it was possible to find the wild
pepper on the North coast of Sumatra. 1 As a consequence, on
his return home, he confided this news to a Salem merchant,
Jonathan Peele, who, in 1795, fitted out a schooner, the
"Rajah 11 , of 134 tons with a crew of ten men and Carnes as
captain. The "Rajah" was gone for eighteen months and re-
turned then with a cargo of bulk pepper which netted its
owners 700 per cent profit. One of the worst trades which
developed was that with the West Coast of Africa. The staple
products of this trade were rum, gun-powder, and tobacco. The
negroes on the West Coast were eager to trade for these and
exchanged in return hides, palm oils, gold dust, and gum copal.
Today, we are recognized as great coffee-drinkers and the
story of how coffee was brought to Salem is indeed interesting.
In 1798, the ship "Recovery" left Salem and returned three
years later in 1801 with a cargo of fragrant berries which
made Mocha famous throughout the world. This trade developed
rapidly and in 1805, two million pounds of Mocha coffee were
landed in Salem. Another interesting phase of Salem voyages
was the hiring of Salem ships by Portuguese and Dutch merchants
1. Marvin, Merchant Marine , p. 201
2. Ibid., p7232
3. Ibid., p.203ff.
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who were privileged to trade with Japan. As early as 1799,
the ship "Franklin" of Boston, with Captain James Devereux of
Salem as captain, was hired by the Dutch East India Company to
take the annual freights to and from Japan. In 1801 the Salem
ship "Margaret" was similarly employed. As a consequence of
this, the people and trade of Japan became known early to
Salem men, and as Marvin points out, it was not strange tnat
after Perry's trip to Japan in 1853, the first vessel to clear
from an American port direct for Japan was the Salem bark
"Edward Koppisch." The duties collected from Salem merchants
on their transactions from 1801 to 1810 amounted to $7,272,000.
Another aspect of Salem trade was tnat which was
opened up with the Philippines. In 1796 the Derby ship "Astrea"
with Captain Henry Prince^- in command found her way to the
Philippines and secured tnere a cargo consisting of 750,000
pounds of sugar, 63,000 pounds of pepper and 29,000 pounds of
indigo. This cargo paid a duty of $24,020 upon its arrival
in Salem and started a great and profitable commerce for
Salem merchants were quick to discover the fine qualities of
Manila hemp, which were unsurpassed for cordage. One may well
imagine the delight of visitors to Sal era as they wandered in
and out of its warehouses. Here were interesting goods and
articles from all over the world. For example, there was nemp
from Luzon, pepper from Sumatra, coffee from Arabia, palm oil
from trie West coast of Africa, cotion from Bombay, duck and
iron from the Baltic, tallow from Madagascar, salt from Cadiz,
1. Mori son, Samuel Eliot. Maritime History of Mas sachusetts
Boston 1921. Houghton, Mifflin, p.94
2. Marvin, Merchant Marine , p. 205
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wine from Portugal and tne Madeiras, figs, raisins, and almonds
from tne Mediterranean, teas and silk from China, sugar, ruin
and molasses from the West Indies, ivory and gum-copal (used
in varnishes and paints) from Zanzibar, rubcer, hides and wool
from South America, wnale oil from the Arctic and Antarctic,
and sperm from tne South 3eas. Imagine tne visitor going in
and out of tne warenouses, looking enviously and longingly at
tne different goods; is it any wonder tnat to be an East India
man, a Salem sailor, or a super-cargo was the desire of all.
In 1807 when the Embargo was declared, Salem had 182
vessels engaged in foreign commerce while at the close of the
war in 1815 there were only 52 Salem vessels employed in foreign
trade. ^ The Embargo had a distressing effect on commerce, and
the War of 1812 completed what the Embargo had begun. Thus,
in 1812 the deep-sea vessels of Salem numbered 126 vessels, of
which 58 were Indiamen.^ This was not such a large decline froiii
the figures of 1807, yet it shows in what direction commerce
was going in Salem. In 1816 42 vessels were employed in the
Far East trade, while in 1817, 32 full-rigged ships, two barks
and eighteen brigs sailed in this trade. 3 The commerce of Salem
was beginning to decline at this time. This was not the con-
dition in Salem alone, but it was true of American shipping as
a whole. The Reciprocity agreement which was discussed in tne
previous chapter gives a fine account of why trade diminished.
Reciprocity replaced protection and the system of discrimin-
ating customs duties and tonnage dues was not as beneficial as
1. Mori son, Maritime History of Massachusetts n 217
2. Marvin, M erchantUar fnefpTglF ' 1 "
3. Ibid., p. 215
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outright protection. In 1821 there were 126 Salem vessels en-
gaged in overseas trade, and tne figures in 1833 were reduced
to 111 goid a constant diminishing is rioted, so tnat by the time
1900 had arrived, Salem had no vessel registered for deep-sea
commerce.
One well may ask why did Salem achieve the greatness
it did. Its harbor to be sure is good, yet not outstanding;
there were no great supplies of timber for ship-building for
this was early exhausted; the people of Salem possessed no
great wealth and there was not a huge supply of goods obtain-
able for use as exports. The secret of its success is well sai<(.
to be found in its merchant class. These men of old Puritan
stock, had a wide and vivid imagination, believed in their own
greatness and will to do and also in the will and ability to
do of their fellow men. This will to conquer the world and to
bring its treasures to Salem is well described by a quotation
Marvin gives of tne Reverend George Bachelor. Bachelor wrote
as follows: 11 In those days crews were made up of Salem ooys,
every one of whom expected to become an East India merchant.
When a captain was asked at Manila how he continued to find his
way into the teeth of a North-east monsoon by mere dead reckon-
ing, he replied that he had a crew of twelve men, any one of
whom could take and work a lunar observation as well for all
practical purposes as Sir Isaac Newton himself. . . . This crew
had in Nathaniel Bowditch, an uncommon super-cargo, but it woulc
be difficult now to find a crew of common sailors wno, even und^r
such a teacher, would willingly master the mysteries of tangents
11
•
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and secants, dip and refraction, sines and cosines."
One of tiie most marvelous of trading voyages was that
which was made famous by Boston boats. It was not a trade
peculiar to Boston—as well as the East India trade was not
peculiar to Salem—but it was a trade which was dominated by
Boston. This was the trade with Canton and a brief description
of tne development and course of this trade is well worthwhile.
The Canton trade was an involved one—for it resulted in the
development of tne Northwest fur trade, the fur-seal fisheries
and the Hawaiian trade all being means to an end—namely,
carrying on trade with Canton. We can well describe the
history of this trade by the history of a given ship— the
ship "Astrae" owned by H.S. Derby and commanded by Capt. James
Magee, Fr. , with Thomas H. Perkins, super-cargo. This ship
Y*as one of fifteen American vessels in Canton in 1789. There
follows a list of her manifest-cargo^- "Thus, Tenney and Brown,
of Newbury, sent '9 kegs of snuff 1 and a note in the margin
of the manifest (cargo) tells captain Magee that 'l/c of the
net proceeds you are to credit to H.E. Derby's account for
freight—the other 2/3 to layout on account of Tenney and
Brown in light goods; opposite the item 'phaeton and names
complete with saddles and bridles, etc., is a note saying
This belongs to Folger Pope.... the net proceeds are
to be credited to H.E.D's account, as friend Derby is to have
the use of the money for freight. David Sears sent 'boxes
containing $15,000, 16 casks of ginseng, 5,570 pounds.' This
1. Spears, John R.
—
Story of American Merchant Marine . New
York. 1910. Macmillan Co. p. 109
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at l/o for freight. William Cabot sent a box 'containing 31
pieces plate, weight 255 ox. 16 dwts, 12 grs. Rums, wines,
oeer, fish, flour 1 598 firkins butter—32,055 lbs. and
spermaceti candles were conspicuous items in the manifest."
The early voyages to Oanton were direct with stops
at tne Cape Verde islands or trie Cape of Good Hope to take
on provisions; later, however, the vessels stopped at the
various islands on their way out—for example the islands of
Madeira, Madras, Pondichery, Batavia, Calcutta, and Bombay.
The stops at Calcutta and Bombay were made to get cargoes of
Indian cotton which was in demand in Canton.^* Likewise at
first the voyages home were direct, but later stops were ma.de
at all European ports from Genoa to St. Petersburg. Canton
teas were sold at Hamburg or at Seghorn; its silks in Spain
and its Nankeens in France.**
It would be well I believe if we digressed for the
moment and discussed trade with those places which were
directly connected with the Canton trade—i.e., the Northwest
fur trade, trade with the Hawaiins, the South Sea islands and
the Seal fisheries. The Northwest fur trade resulted through
the discovery of tne value of tne rich furs of tne sea-otters
which abounded off the Northwest coast. Tnese skins could be
bought from the natives for a few trinkets and were sold at a
premium^ in Canton due to the great demand for them. The
Chinese people delignted in the purchase of the sea-otter
fur because they used it extensively in their adornment and
1. Dulles, Foster Rnea. The Old ChinaTrade. Boston 1930
Hougnton Mifflin Co. d73§ 1 *
2. Ibid. p. 39
3. Morison, G. 2.—Maritime History of Massachus_etts p. 57
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it brought about the development of one of the most important
branches of commerce. One of the first voyages made was that
of the ship Columbia, Captain Roo't Kendrick commanding. It
sailed around Cape Horn up to Nostka sound. The ingenuity
of the traders is shown for they fashioned chisels out of
scrap-iron—making tnem about eight inches long and using thera
for currency. A prime sea otter skin was worth six to eight
chisels, a blanket or a looking glass. Six furs were trading
equipment enough to be exchanged for a musket.^ The Columbia
carried the American flag around the world for tne first time
and disposed of its furs for 350 chests of Bonea tea. This
trade with tne Northwest coast was very exciting and full of
adventure, plus tne added pleasant feature that it was very,
very profitable. The dangers were to be found in the irregular
and rugged coast-line, which had many reefs, sunken rocks,
strong tides, and no bottom for a good anchorage. The feature
which was worse, however, was that of Indian attack. Many
examples can be cited of this, but the mere mentioning of one
sufficient for our purpose. In 1805, tne natives in and
around Hotka sound attacked the ship Boston, Captain Salter
and slaughtered all the ships crew but two. This is of
course an extreme case but let us quote trie words of Captain
Kendrick to Gray, "treat the natives with respect wherever
you go. Cultivate friendship with them as much as possible
and take nothing from them but what you pay them for according
to a fair agreement and not suffer your people to affront them
1. Dulles
—
Old CninaTrade. p. 54
2. Mori son
—
Maritime Histo ry of Mas sachusetts p. 55

or treat them til. -* The trade was interesting and variaole
because tne Indians were constantly changing tneir minds. As
a consequence Cargoes were constantly being varied and here
is a brief mention of some items used—colored blankets, beads,
trinkets, cnisels, knives, nails, molasses, and sugar, with
occasionally rum,^ but this was only taken at rare intervals.
The trade diminished due to tne fact tnat in tne War of 1812
many American vessels were captured and held by the British
and also due to the fact tnat tne furs were getting scarce
and trie Indians were demanding nigh prices. Tne fur trade
to make a profit was dependent to a. great extent on cneap
barter and the decline in furs and exorbitant demands of the
Indians meant a slow, lingering death whicn was hastened with
the advent of tne War of 1812. In conclusion I will mention
the quotations which Dulles gives of the importations of sea-
otter furs into Canton from 1790 to 1812—and 1812 to 1834.
1790-1812 the average annual imports amounted to about 12,000
furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average annual imports amounted
to about 12,000 furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average
annual imports amounted to about 2,000 a year.
The trade with the uawaiin islands was probably
begun by the Columbia, with Rob't Gray captain, which touched
at Hawaii in August, 1789 on her first voyage around the world.
The Columbia was at anchor for twenty-four days and undoubtedly
used tne time to stock up with fresh vegetables, water and othe^r
provisions.; the vegetables which were abundant in the island
1. Liorison—Maritime History of Massachusetts p. 55
2. Dulles
—
Old ChinaTrade . p."65
c. .iorison, Samuel Eliot. Boston Traders in tne Hawaiin Island r1789-1323." iiass. Hist. Society Proceedings. 192U-1921 VoiTo^'.
Published by Society, p. 12
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yams, tarns; also fruits; i.e. musk melons, subar cane, salt,
1
bread fruit and of great importance fresh water. One could
guy a ^ood-sized nog according to Morison for five to ten
spikes. The real hero of tae iiawaiin trade, now ever, was
Captain Kendrick for he discovered that .aawaii produced much
Sandalwood and as a consequence since this was in great de-
mand in China, he was a nero. Outside of sandalwood there were
no otner gooas, except pearls, taken from Hawaii. Txie vessels
stopped for cargoes of sandalwood, got fresh provisions and
sailed for Canton. The principal goods which were brought
to Hawaii were fire-arms, ammunitions, European clotnes,
table-cloths and rum. The imports of sandalwood into Canton
2
were as follows: from 1804-1805, 900 piculs of 135 l/Z oounds
each; from 1811-1812, 19,056 piculs; from 1817-1818, 15,825
piculs; from 1811 to 1825 about 2,000 annually. King
Kamehameha I, in order to conserve it, put sandalwood traffic
under restraint in 1820-1821 and as a result it fell off
about c,000 piculs annually in those two years. A picul
averaged 155 l/3 pounus and the price varied from $8 to $10 a
picul. Sandalwood was used in China for incense and the making
of fancy articles. Trie various kings with the exception of
Kamehameha did little to preserve the sandalwood and the
natives were kept busy collecting it. As a. consequence the
best years of the trade were from 1810 to 1325 because by that
time the Chinese or Canton market was flooded and there was
no demand for it. Thus, a new aspect in the life of tne
1. Mori son
—
Boston Traders in Hawaii
,
p. 13
2. Ibid., p.r?
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islands began after 1820 for then missionaries arrived to
teach the people the better side of life and this bringing in
of civilization resulted in a demand for American goods.
In 1810 another adventurous and oroii table trade was
1
opened up by the bar* "Active," Captain Richardson, with the
Fiji Islands and the islands of tne Soutn Seas; i.e. Marquesas,
Guam, Tahitii, Samoa, etc., The most peculiar part of this
trade especially with the Fijis was tnat founded on Becne de
met 9 fa* tne Fiji Islands there grows abundantly a most
peculiar sea-slug which is highly valued as food in tne Orient.
This sea-slug or beche de mer is used by trie Chinese in making
soup and is said to oe very palataole. Tne work of gathering
up the sea-slugs, drying and preparing tnem for market was not
only difficult and tedious, but also drawn out. It was many
months before a proper cargo was secured and tnen most vessels
woaxd either sail direct to Canton and exchange the beche-de-
mer for tea or else they would go to Manila and exchange it
for heap and sugar. Tne trade witn the South Sea Islands was
not confined alone to oeche-de-rner
,
however, for there were
many products which were in demand in Canton. For example,
sandalwood (which cost about a cent a pound ana sold for
thirty-four cents in Canton), tortoise shell, motner of pearl,
ediole oirds nests, and shares fins. Becne-de-mer was cured
by boiling it in oot-nouses on the beach and tnen drying it and
2
storing it away in matting bags. Tne chief goods or products
which were carried to the islands were simply an assortment
1. Marvin
—
Merchant Marine
, p. 208
2. Dulles Old China Trade
, p. 96
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of trinkets, iron tools, whales teeth, hatohets, knives, glass
oottles, calicos, needles, nails and looking glasses. The
trade was Hazardous botn oecause of tne wild coral reefs, un-
chartered shores ajid treachery and Cannibal ism of tne natives.
The Real fisheries were established mainly in tne
Falklands, Patagonia, LLasafuera and tne waters s outn of Cape
Horn. In the year 1784, Lady naley, trie sister of J ,nn Wilkes,
the famous English reformer sent trie ship States to the
Falklands for hair-seal skins ana sea-eleohant oil andin
1
addition the crew brought back about 13,000 fur seal skins.
The demand in the United States was slight, out when tne skins
were taken to Canton, they sold at an average of $5 apiece
compared with 50<£ in this country. "I'he profits oi seal skins
were enormous, although the prices were always fluctuating from
50<£ up to $3 and $5. Profits of necessity had to be large
because the voyages lasted from two to three years and tne
time was spent off cold, barren islands. Shore gangs or crews
went on the islands, Killed tne seals, skinned them, scraped
off the blubber and then cured tne furs by pegging them in
tne sand to oe cured either by the sun or salt. The living
conditions were indeed terrible for tne men were forced to
live in rude huts, and got most of their food by shooting wild
hogs, eese, and ^.oats. Tne crews were often marooned due
to tne fact tnat tneir vessels left thea to go after more sea2s
and did not return. When such an event took place tne molasses
oread and coffee left behind Droved very meagre and although
1. Dulles
—
Old China Trade
, p. 82
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the sailors sailed, on shares, tnere was considerable mutiny,
rioting and desertion. The seal trade lasted until the War
of 1812 practically ruined it, togetner witn tne i*act that
tne seals were practically annihilated. It revived temporarily
in 181o due to tne discovery of the people of 8toughton of
Palmers Island and the South Snetlands, but the trade was
gone and the s^ins were now for tne most part sent to the
United States.
Tne goods taken to Canton for trade were sea-otter
and land-otter, beaver, fox and seal skins, eoony, copper,
cochineal, sandalwood, steel and brimstone, lead, quicksilver,
betel-nut, ginseng, opium, iron and silver dollars and specie.
Tne g-oas taken from Canton were largely tea; i.e. Bonea,
Congo, Sjnchong, Hyson Skin, Imperial, and Tokay, cassia,
chinaware, camphor, sugar rnuoaro
,
silks, sewing silk, pepper,
sugar, Cc\ndy, anise-seed, saltpeter, nankeens, white lead, etc.
A mercnant usually gave letters of instruction to the captain
and super-cargo ana I willquote from Deroy's letters of in-
struction to the caotains and super-cargo of trie "Astrae"
1
Captain Jonn Magee and super-cargo Tnomas H. Perkins. "Make
the best of your way for Batavia, and on j our arrival there
you will dispose of sucn a part of the cargo as you think may
oe most for ray interest. I think you had best sell a few
ca.sks of the most ordinary ginseng, if you can get one doi Lar
a pound for it. If you find tne or ice of sugar to oe low
you will then take into tn snip as much of tne be^t white
1. Speare— Story of American Merchant Marine, p. 110-111-112.

kind as vvill floor her, end fifty thousand .veight of coffee if
it is e s Ion es we have heard, aid fifteen thousand of
salt-peter, if it is very low some nutmegs, end fifty thousand
-veight of oepoer; this ; rou ./ill store In the fore oeak for
fear of injuring the teas. The sugars will save the expense
of any stone-ballast, and it will make a floor for the teas,
etc., at Canton. At Betavia you must, if possiole, get es much
freight for Canton as will pay half or more of your charges
You must endeavor to be the first ship with Ginseng, for
be assured you will do better alone than you will if there are
three or four ships at Canton at the same time with you.
Cant. Magee and Mr. Perkins ere to heve o% commission for the
pales of zhe present cargo, and 2h% on the cargo home, end also
b% on the profit made on goods that may be purchased at B.- tavia
f nd sold at Canton, or in eny other similar case that may arise
on the voyage. They ere to heve one-half the passege money,
the other half belongs to the ship. The privilege of Captain
Magee is b% of what the ship carries on cargo, exclusive of
edventures. The property of Mr. Perkins, it is understood, is
to be on freight, which is to be paid for like other freighters
It is orders chat the ships books shall be open to the in-
spection of the mates and doctor of the ship, so the; r may know
the whole business "in case of the death of the captain or
super-cergo You are not to pay an;/ money to the crew
while absent from home, unless in case of real necessity, end
than they must allow an advance for the money... it is likewise
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my order that in case of Tour sickness that you write a clause
at the foot of bhese orders outting the command of the ship
into the person" s • hands that you think the most equal Co it,
not having any regard to uhe station he at present has in the
ship The sale of uhe Astrae is foroidden for this voyege,
bit if at Bfctavia or Canton you can agree to deliver her the
next season for #20,000 or $25,000 you may do it You have
leave to break them (the orders) in any part ..here you by cal-
culation think it for my interest."
The Astrae arrived in Canton when there were fifteen
other American vessels there and as a consequence her ginseng
sold for .$20,000 less than prime cost and sne was forced to pay
$27,300 in import duties.-'- As a consequence her trip was
hardly successful.
The way in which business was transacted is .veil
worth reading. As may have been recognized from the above
quotation the captain and super-cargo were allowed a certain
amount of free space in the vessel. This space was usually
reserved to friends and business associates of the owners, who
could upon payment of freight and commission, place small ship-
ments in che hands of the super-cargo and give him the oower to
trade for them in Canton on ttte oest terms he could obtain.
This idea created interest in the voyage and stimulated trade;
it helped to raise capital and even the poorest oerson could
invest .vith only a small speculation.
The trade in Canton was most unusual. ^ There the
1. Spears— Story of American Merchant Marine , o. 112
2. Dulles--0ld China Trade. d\ 17-18
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hongs (factories or homes) contained a ground or street floor
where the tea and silk m s kept, while oho upner storss were
reserved for living quarters. Trade could only be conducted
by the co-hong (body of Chinese merchants) who paid for the
privilege of trading with foreigners. Thus, the captain or
super-cargo would get a member of the co-hong to act as the
security merchant of the srip--that is the member of the co-
hong would agree to be responsiole to the government of Canton
not only for the ship and c argo, but also for the cre»v and
their good behavior. In addition, there was a comprador, a man
who handled and took care of the needs for ships supolies and
the lactones ashore. These men were honest and of high caliber
for the co-hongs insisted upon it. Last but not leapt there
were the linguists who used pidgin English. They acted as
interpreters and supplied samoans to load and unload the ships.
This, in brief is the way trade was transacted, but there ,»ere
many limitations put on the social life of the factories; i.e.,
there could be no boating on the river, and no mrofflan could
walk in the gardens.
The Canton trade was very successful, but yet it had
many difficult periods. The Embargo of 1807 was a very
definite check on trade; as were the British with their im-
pressments. For example in 1812 the British blockaded the port
of Canton and as a result American shipping suffered greatly.
fltS the advent of peace commerce revived. Dulles-'- gives a
list of American vessels in Canton from 1815 to 1819. In the
1» Dulles --Old China Trade, p. 110

year 1015-1816 there were 30; 1816-ldlV, 38; 1817-1818, 39;
and 1818-1819, 47. The total value of ell American imports at
Ccnton from June 6, 1816 to Mey 25, 1817 we s estimated at
$5,609,600, while the exports were valued at #5,703,000;
American disbursements in oort ,vere estimated at $250,000.^
The Canton trade was highly developed for many years to follow
and as sort of a comparison of present day conditions with
those I heve mentioned, let us consider how trade is now
carried on. Silk shipments and tea but not so much are now
sent in fast freighters from Japan and China to the Pacific
oorts; i.e., Sen Francisco end Vancouver, etc. Uoon arrival
the shipments ere put on fast trains and sent to the Eastern
markets. These trains are given right of way through the lines
and usually make the trip in from 70 to 75 hours. Pest time is
essential for when the demand is urgent, the goods must be on
hand. The rates are exceedingly high, but e wait of a day or
two to ship the silk by ship might mean a heavier loss due to
the fluctuation of the demand and market price. Conditions
have changed greatly and one must only marvel at the dangers
and hardships which the Canton merchants of the olden days over
came with their skill, ingenuity, end foresight.
An off-shoot of the Northwest end Canton trade we
s
that of South America. Trade vith South America began early
8nd .ves not bothered by our ocean war with Prence in 1798-1800
or by the war with England in 1812.^ The high peak of the trad?
was not reached, however, until after 1815. Trade with most
1. Dulles-- 01d China Trade , p. Ill
2. Marvin—American Merchant Marine. 0.205
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South American countries was prohibited but was carried on by-
smuggling. The priests and officials bought smuggled goods and
were willing to exchange furs, skins,, and copper for them. The
American vessels usually carried specie; i.e., silver dollars
end this vvas used as a medium of exchange for copper, etc.
Firearms, tablecloths, and rum were staple commodities on all
vessels. In return for such goods, Americans received copper
from Chile which was exchanged for tet in Canton; shales teeth
from the Galapagos Islands, sandalwood from Ingrahams Islands,
fur seals from off the Chilean coast. Sugar was probably the
most important import with rubber, hides, cocoa, and coffee
coming in in large quantities. The South American trade was
important but to us only as an out-growth of the Canton trade,
for the period of its greatest height was reached after the
period with which we are concerned.
There is one more trend of trade with which fire are
concerned; namely, that of the ,iiest Indies. This trade first
came into, being due to the fact that in the early days
the ytfest Indies were the first outlet for New England lumber,
nrovisions, and dried fish and rum. In return we imported
molasses, chiefly, Jamaica rum, cocoa, sugar, tobacco. Once
again several Yankee merchants soon developed triangular trade
--namely, going to the west Indies, getting cargoes of rum,
and trinkets, for their dried cod-fish and lumber, and then
sailing to Africa ^vhere they exchanged their cargoes for human
freight--namely
,
slaves, and returning to the .jest Indies
1. Morlson--Mc ritime History of Massachusetts p. 12
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where the slaves were exchanged for sugar and tobacco, and
thence home. This trade, however, was not carried on to a
great extent, for it proved a bit too repulsive to most of the
Puritan merchants who usually shunned at nothing. It is true,
however, that despite the trend of Puritanical thought, many
Beacon street fortunes were derived from the profits of this
trade. Morison states that after 1788, due to laws passed
forbidding the trade, the slave trade was only a minor item.l
Trade with the west Indies was always protested by England,
and especially after the war of 1812, as has been mentioned
before in Chapter III. The trade was an important one, however
and despite the many restrictions, the handy New England
merchants managed to carry it on, with the aid of the islanders
the-nselves .
1. Morison, S. E. --Maritime History of Massachusetts p. 19-32-3£
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WAR OF 1812
AND Ifa EFFECT ON MASSACHUSETTS COMMERCE
How did the people of New England and more especially
the people of Msssachuset ts feel Coward the .va'r? On January
25, 1812, the Honorable Josiah Quiincv, a Federalist end
opposed to war, speaking in the House of Representatives of the
United States, said, "it is the incumbent duty of every nation
to protect its essential interests, thus it is the most im-
pressive and critical duty of a nation, composed of a voluntary
association of vast, powerful, and independent states, to
protect the essential interests of all its great component
parts. 1 Quincy states further that "Every local circle of
states, as well es of individuals, has a set of interests, in
the prosperity of whicn, the happiness of the section to which
they belong is identified."^ To further strengthen and
develop his plea for protection of commerce, Quincy quotes
figures in which he states the relative proportion of the
commercial interests to population. He endeavors to show that
in the country North of the Hundson, although its population
is approximately two and one-half million and its commercial
interests predominate, agriculture and manufacture have grown
up in more intimate relation to commerce. He means, in other
words, that industry there has its shape and energy from
commercial prosperity "manufacture have s direct or indirect
reference to the construction, supply and support of naviga-
1. Speech of the Honorable Josian ^uincy in the House of Rep-
resentatives of the U. S. January 25, 18,2. (Boston
Public Library. 4318.40) In Relation to Mantime Protec-
tion 18pp. p.
2
2. ibid. p.
3
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tion .... while agriculture in s country divided into small
farms, among a population gr oa t--compared with its extent--
requires quick circulation and easy processes, in the exchange
of its commodities , and this can be obtained only by an active
and prosperous commerce."! To quote again from Quincy, "I
state that it appears by the above abstract that the single
state of Massachusetts alone possesses nearly half a million
of tonns ge--in round numbers 496,000 tons, equal within 50,000
tons, to the whole tonnage owned by all states South of the
Hudson.'1 The abstract to which Quincy refers shows the aggre-
gate tonnage of the United States, which he estimates at
1,424,000, with 221,000 owned between the Mississippi and Poto-
mac and 321,000 between the Potomac end Hudson. He estimates
the tonnage North of the Hudson as 882,000 which gives the
sinerle state of lit ssachusetts practically a little over half.^
We can discuss now the attitude of the State of
Massachusetts itself, bearing in mind at all times that manu-
facture and agriculture bear an intimate relationship to
commerce. In the Spring of 1812, Massachusetts was represented
in the Senate by 'James Lloyd, a moderate Federalist, and
Joseph B. Varnum, a Republican and supoorter of the war. In
1810, Massachusetts elected 17 members to the House, 9 Federa-
lists, and 8 Republicans, while in 1812, out of 20 members
elected, 17 were Federalists.*^ This increasing apportionment
of Federalists is an indication of the attitude of the state
toward the war. The election of the Federalists showed that
ti Quincy, In Relation to Mantime Protection p.
4
•d. ibid. o.4
3. Allen, Gardner jtf. Massachusetts in ,u r of 1812. Common-
.vealth History of Massachusetts vol. 3 p. 474
cc
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War was not favored because the Federalists advocated secession
if wer we s declared, and as Governor Sullivan had declared
earlier in e letter to Jefferson, the reports in the State
were that the British government send armed forces to take
nossessioa of the state and make it once again a deoendent of
England.
1
The Federalists carried all elections in the state
during the war by large majorities: and Caleb Strong, an
extreme Federalist araa governor throughout the period.'^ The
attitudes of the Governor and both houses of the Legislature
during this period are interesting. The State Senate declared
during one of its sittings that "Beyond that submission which
lews enacted agreeably to the Constitution make necessary, and
that self-defence which the obligation to repel nostile in-
vasion justifies, e people can give no encouragement to a war
of such a cheracter without becoming partakers in its guilt,
and rendering themselves obnoxious to those .just retributions
of Divine Vengeance by which, sooner or later the authors end
abettors of such a .;ar will be assuredly overtaken. "^ A
committee of the legislature reported, "whenever the national
compact is violated and the citizens of this State ere
oppressed by cruel end unauthorized laws, the legislature is
bound to interpose its power and wrest from the oppressor his
victim.^ Josiah Quincy who was now in the State Senate of
Massachusetts, on June 15, 1813, offered the following measure
to that august body "Resolved, as the sense of the Senate of
1. Seers. Jefferson and the Embargo. p. 68-69
£. Allen. Massachusetts in War of 1812. p. 475
3. ibid. p. 475
4. ibid. p. 476
|
c
c
— I. I. '" 11 -" 1
Massachusetts that in a wrap like the present, waged without
justifiable cruse and prosecuted in a manner which indicates
that conquest end ambition fre its real motives, it is not
becoming a moral end religious people to express any approba-
tion of military or namal exploits which ere not immediately
connected with defence of our sea-coast and soil."! Not only
did the legislature of Che state condemn the W£ r , but even
town-meetings exoressed their disapproval. For example, the
town of Newbury in a .town meeting adopted this memorial: ",,/e
remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions which
dwindled into insignificance when compared with those which
.ve a re called on to endure. The rights which we hive received
from God we will never yield to man. we cell on our State
Legislature to protect us in the enjoy/ment of those privileges
to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which , ( e pro-
fess ourselves ready to resist unto blood.
The quotations which I heve mentioned give one the
impression that the war found little favor in Massachusetts.
Such, of course, to be perfectly frank, is true; end yet when
one studies the figures of volunteers and men in war regiments
one finds that the State of Massachusetts ./as well represented.
One he s to keep in mind at all times, though, that enlistments
were mede for the most pert for short terms end consequently,
it is fairly difficult to get an accurate estimate of the men
enlisted from Massachusetts et any one time. Bradford states
that the whole number of militia called out in Massachusetts
1. Hr rt , Go t\ rionwea 1 th history of Massachusetts vol.3 p. 475
2. ibid. p. 475-476
(c
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during the war yfaa es time ted et 45,000 and that the greater
Dortion of this number en listed during the months of July,
August, September, end October, 1814.1 Hapfc mentions the
large number to enlist in the regular army, but gives no
difinite figures. The ninth Infantry of the First Brigade from
Massachusetts performed with gallantry at the Ja&tle of
Uhipeiva, July 5, 1814. The t ;>,enty-fir st regiment of the
Second Brigade was recruited in Massachusetts, as were the
thirty-third and thirty-fourth regiments of regulars .'^ As
Hart goes on to show, the population of Massachusetts and
Virginia did not differ greatly, yet Massachusetts contributed
four times es much money to supoort the war and many more men.
On the other hand, Harlow^ states that the Middle States
ourchased $35, 000, 000 ^orth of bonds as opposed to ^3,000,000
worth in New England during the entire duration of the war. In
1814, six regiments--the ninth, twenty-first, thirty-third,
thirty-fourth, fortieth, and forty-fifth were recruited in
Massachusetts for the regular ermy, and only three regiments
were recruited in Virginia. ,»e must not forget too, that the
manoower of the navy and of privateers was drawn, for the most
pert, from Massachusetts and New England. Bredford, in his
History of Massachusetts, estimates that the exoense occurred
by the Co monwealth amounted to $800,000.
One mey well ask>-how do you explain the actions of
the State Legislature and of the various town meetings and yet
heve e lerge militia, enlistments in the regular ermy, and e
1. Bradford, Alden. History of Messachusetts . 3 volumes
Boston 18^9 vol.3 p. 230
2
' liert. p. 486
3. Ri r low, Kalph Volney. Growth of the United States. New
York 1932 Revised. 72 chapters. 872 pD . n.294
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good donation of money. The best answer is that the State of
Me ssachusetts was ruled by e very small minority of reaction-
aries who preferred to maintain their commerce and trade by
the acceptance of insults from England. And yet one cannot be
entirely satisfied with that answer--for we must admit thi t
the government in Washington was at fault too. To explain this
latter statement, let us remember Jefferson and his Embargo
which has been mentioned before. The Embargo with all its
restrictions on American shios and shipping was greatly felt
in Massachusetts which in 1807 owned more than one-third of the
registered tonnage engaged in the carrying trade. The Em-
bargo, although it was broken, was injurious to commerce, and
as Hart says, produced stagnation and bankruptcy in the coest
towns--i.e. ports like Salem, Beverly, and Newburyport
suffered materially end never fully recovered from this inter-
ruDtion to their prosperit-.y. The Embargo likewise aided
manufacturing, and as a result, old industries expanded end
new ones developed. The Federalists at the time were chiefly,
interested in shipping, and since they were the aristocrats of
the time and owned or controlled most of the money and means
for doing business, they were h&rdest hit. Consequently, //hen
Jefferson repealed the Embargo, he did so with full knowledge
that he had revived the almost defunct Federalist p?rty,
transforming it into a political organization, which ./as to be
until 181b anti-federal and anti-nationa 1 The extreme group
which controlled the State of Ms ssachusetts hoped to establish
1. Sears, J. M. Jefferson end the Em oargo. 0.145
2. Hart, A. B. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts
. p. 433
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a New England Confederation, and in the Hartford Convention of
1814 the only reason that prevented a secession we s the feet
that the Federalists, who comprised the peace party find repre-
sented about one-half of the people, .vere split among them-
selves. The more radical of their leaders were held at bay
because the moderate Federalists threatened to leave the party
if any ect of treason was committed. Hart stctes that as a
consequence that State was controlled by a minority of about
one-fourth of the people. We must remember too that the
merchant interests es championed by the Federalists were
bitterly opoosed by the people of the hinterlands--namely
,
farmers, etc., and es a consequence the extreme Federalists
were opnosed by powerful interests. Also one wonders if those
Federalists who had invested their fortunes derived from
commerce in manufacture did not onoose extreme Federalists
because of impetus which war would give to manufacturers.
This extreme minority refused to take up arms unless
New England was actually invaded, and they likewise refused to
go out of their own territory to fight. As an example of
their reasoning let us see what took pi? ce when the Secretary
of War issued his call for 25,000 men from New England—based
on the theory that Congress had the right to ask for militia
for nationel defense because it had the po.ver to declare war*
Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
told Governor Strong that the right to decide when the con-
stitutions! exigency had arisen which should call the State
1. Hrrt. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts p. 47/
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Militia into National service rested with him, rather than
with Congress or the President. * Governor Strong declared
that neither foreign invasion nor domestic insurrection existed
end that hterefore he must decline the President ' s request for
the State's quota of militis for the defence of the coast. In
retaliation the national government, since it could not eniorce
its request, withdrew the garrisons from the New England forts,
leaving those States to defend themselves and refused to send
them their quota of the arms which were distributed among the
States. When late in the war due to, the danger of British in-
vasion Governor Strong did call out the militia for the defence
of the coast and Maine—;hich he previously had refused to do,
he was careful to make it appear evident that these troops
were not in the National service. 2 Thus, he had their own
commending officer apoointed--a state officer, thus a state
army. Alhen Massachusetts sought reimbursement for the use of
these troops, the National government most emphatically denied
it.
There are two more things which concern the State of
Massachusetts in the war--namely, trading with the enemy, and
the rise of the privateers. we know that the people of
Massachusetts were not satisfied with the war. They objected
to it because it hindered the revival of commerce and trade.
We must remember that previous to the war, the various decrees
and embargoes were practically discarded. As a consequence,
the trade which had been handicapped now oegan to develop some
] . Hart
.
21 Hart.
Commonwealth History of Massachusetts
Commonwealth History of Massachuse ts
p. 477
p. 477
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of its former proportion. So when ,var was declared, the
oeople who //ere carrying on trade with the enemy continued to
do so. This trade tri s fostered by the British government. The
British government was forced co issue licenses to cerry on
trade beer- use the war with Prance was still being waged in
Portugal and Spain, end the British army was dependent on the
American merchantmen for its food supolies. The licenses
which were issued by the British Admiralty allowed the vessels
to pees through the blockades end rendered them free from
ceoture on the high seas. These licenses .vore issued end open-
ly bought end sold in the lerge ports--i.e. Boston, New Yor'-r,
end Philedelphie . 1 Trade frith the British Colonial possessions
was carried on in the same menner--that is, the Colonial
givernors issued licenses which permitted trade in the ^est
Indies, Newfoundland, Nova Scotie ; and Hert states that the
British ermy in Canada lived on flour end beef which was our-
chesed in Upoer Hew England and New York. In fact, every
seeboerd state traded with the enemy, and this trade developed
into such an evil that in December, 1815, Madison had passed
an Embargo which was repealed in April, 1814.2 This Embargo
forbade ell vessels to leave ports of the United States, with
the sole exception of foreign ships which could leave with
necessary sea stores and whatever goods they had on board. The
Emb8rgo further steted thet the Collectors of the Ports could
search eny ship, or seize eny product or freight which they
believed was ii tended for exportation. Channing and Hert both
1. Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts. d.497
a. Channing, Edward, A History of the Unite! States. N;w
York 1927. vol. IV p.b37
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stete that the Embargo, instead of preventing trede, merely
made it more expensive end land transportation was now at a
premium. In fact, the demand so far exceeded the supply that
prices Immediately rose and remained high until peace was
declared. Ghanning gives an example of the rise end fall in
nrices in Boston during this period.
1
Rise and Fall of Prices in Boston 1812-1815
Flour Beef Coffee Molasses Fuel Joel Tobacco
(bbl.) (lb.) (lb.) (gal.) (ton) (lb.)
1812 $11 .07-. 10 .15-. 16 .52-$ .75 $14 .06
1813 fa.3-fl7 .07-. 10 .20-. 50 .75- 1.47 $14 .09-. 13
1834 $14-$15 .07-. 10 .24-. 37 .85- 1.08 |#7 .06*-. 13
1815 $9.25-$7.50 .07-. 13 .24-. 27 .70- 1.60 $20 .07
ti. s we may .veil note prices were high in 1814 due to
the Embargo snd the bulky goods rose higher than others, due
nrobably to the cost of trenspor tation . I think it is inter-
esting to noce that the orice of beef vas practically constant
and ./onder if the answer is not to be found in the fact that
the source of supply was probably to £ lap ge extent local.
Bradford states^ that the vinter of 1814 in Massachusetts was
one of greet anxiety and embarassment . There was no immediate
danger from the enemy, but the long suspension of navigation
end commerce had impoverished the oeople, end t ,var of nearly
three years had subjected many to privations and sufferings.
The results of the repeal of the Embargo and the signing of
neace in 1815 will be discussed later when we view the effects
of the war itself on commerce.
One of the memorable highlights of the Afar of 1812
1. Channing. History of U. S. Vol. IV p. .'38
•d. Bradford, Alden, History of Massachusetts Vo n
. I r I 326 pp.
Boston 1829 Vol HI p. 222
<
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end one of the whole redeeming features of the war from an
American viewpoint is the rise of the privateers. Unfortunately
although the Federal Government was strong for privateers, the
strict Federalists in New England were not, and as a conse-
quence it is very difficult to get a real vie.; of the situation.
I say strict Federalists did not favor privateers, and once
again the answer is found in the fact that they felt that such
activity hindered their commerce. On the other hand though
here was a chance for th° sailors and merchants to put their
ships to ,»ork. added inducement was of course the high-
reward which you received if you were successful in capturing
many vessels end the risk involved only aided in whetting the
appetite of the devil may care Yankee sailors. It has been
said that the trade which Massac usetts and New England
carried on with the enemy during the .;er of 1812 was 8 safety
valve which prevented ectual secession from the Union. I be-
lieve that is true, end yet I think the t the astonishing ris 3
and growth of the privateers is still another factor in keeping
the Now England states in the National fold.
There is no definite estimate of the number of
privateers which were in i ction during the mr. Different
writers disagree--Har t gives the following figures^ which are
taken from two sour ces--namely
,
George Emmons in a History of
the United States Navy gives the number of 529 orivateers in
the .ifv of 1812, of whicJ 129 were from Massachusetts; Captain
Coggeshall, himself, a privateer states that only 250 ships
Hart, Common History of Massachusetts p. 494
i<
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from the whole country were engaged cs privateers during the
var, and of these 87 were from Massachusetts. Estimating from
the above figures, I believe it is safe to say that the per-
centage of privateers in the War from Mas sachusetts was between
one-fourth and one-third of the totsl number. Such a percentag(
obviously shows tnat the good merchants of the Bay State did
their pfrt. The greatest number of privateers in Massachusetts
,vas furnished by two ports; namely, Boston and Salem, and of
the two, Salem had a slight edge. The privateers all over the
country took in a total number of prizes estimated between
1300 £nd 1500. we can get a better view of tne situation by a
brief discussion of some of the exploits of privateers from
Selen. One of the most famous was che ship "Grand Turk,"
which, transposed from a merchantmen to a privateer, captured
three ships, twelve brigs, seven schooners, end eight sloops
of the enemy. * The most famous privateer was the ship
"Hnerica" owned by the famous Growinshield family. She carried,
twenty guns and one hundred and fifty seamen. The number of
orizes which she captured were twenty-six valued at q>l, 100,000
ynd she likewise destroyed a greater amount at sea. 2 The
Common History of Massachusetts edited by Hart conflicts with
Marvin for it stat-s that twenty-seven vessels were captured
and brought safely to port, while eight were destroyed and
seven were recaptur-'d. It does agree at estimating the total
value of the profits at ,#1 , 100,000 --of which more than half a
million was taken by the officers and crew as cheir shares.
1. Marvin, tf. L., The American Merchant Marine. ^©w York
1902 436 pp. 18 chaps. p. 214
2. Ibid., p. 214

^Such is a mention ii brief of some privateers, others vvere not
as successful— indeed many privateers were captured, and since
more men ./anted to join the armed privateers than fcha navy--
the matter of recruiting a good navy ,vas rendered difficult.
The i oortaace of cue privateers cannot be denied, and Marvin
states that it was "the extraordinary vigor and aggressive-
ness of the merchant marine and shipping transformed into
privateers which saved America and let her commissioners make
an honorable oeace, instead of a humiliating one if land
struggle was to be considered."
<<
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CHAPTER IV
PEACE- -EFFECTS OA COMMERCE, RECIPROCITY ON SEA
RISE OF MANUFACTURES, TARIFF OF 1816
After every .<ar business seems to undergo a period
of false recovery which is in turn followed by a fell in prices
or better still, a depression. The War of 1812 we s no ex-
ception to the rule--prices before the war had reached an
average of about 90-95 for the years 1810-1812. They con-
tinued to go up during the war until they reached the ex- •
cessively high peak of approximately 125 and then with the
advent of peace they reached an average of about 100 in 1817-
1818, and with the panic of 1819 they dropned end dropoed to
about en average of 70 in 1820."'" The chief reason for this
decline is probably to be found in the loss of the foreign
markets. Europe was quick to revive her own carrying trade;
i.e., shipping interests, end England was not at all adverse to
keeping uer ports closed to American shipping. The period
between 1816 and 1830 .is described as one of Reciprocity on
,9
the Sea.- That is, United states and England signed a recip-
rocity treaty which stated that no discriminating duties on
sriips or products in the trade between this country end the
United Kingdom could be imposed. At first glance one is in-
clined to believe that the United States would benefit thereby
^or her commerce would now oe able to carry on direct trade
with all British possessions. Such was not the case, for the
British wisely insisted that they would continue to control
1. The Pathfinder Magezine. Pathfinder Publishing Company
Washington, D. C, January 6, 1934. No. 2088 p-o.l and 8
2. Marvin, winthrop L . American Merchant Marine. o. 173
••
=ynd regul8te the trede of Canada and fehe west Indies as they
so desired and likewise they stated that American shins should
engage only in direct trade with the British E* s t Indies.
Since these provisions were not apparently harsh enough, it ,;es
provided that American flour, vegetables, lumoer, fish, and
cattle could be carried to the West Indies in vessels owned by
British subjects.! As a consequence, an American fleet of
approximately 80,000 tons was laid up in idleness, plus the
added fact that since American ports had now been opened to
British shipping they soon flooded the American market with
huge quantities of manufactured goods such as woolens, cottons,
chine ware, £nd hardware. The British elso developed a tri-
angular trade which HcMaster^ describes as follows: "The
profits of this triangular voyage enabled her (A British vessel
to bring British goods, wares, and merchandise from England to
the United States for much, less than the actual cost of
trans oortat ion on en American vessel, which could not make a
similar voyage. An English merchant carrier could even afford
to bring goods from Liverpool to New York at an actual loss,
inasmuch as she could easily recover on the voyages from N;w
York to the west Indies, and from the West Indies back to
Liverpool, on neither of which American shipoing could affect
him. In the hope of doing to American shipping what false
invoices and auction sales had already done to American im-
oorters, manufacturers, and retailers, the direct trade between
England and America was carried on by Englishmen so much below
1. Marvin, Winthrop L., American Merchant Marine p. ^6
z. McMaster, John Bach, History of American People 6 vols.
New York 1895 Vol. IV p. 348
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the cost of the voyage that during the summer of 1816, beef
end tallow, buttor, hams, end potatoes .vere actually brought
from Gal./ay end Newny to New York where they undersold our
home oroducts. Indeed companies ./ere formed to continue their
importation. Thus, the one trade which by the convention
seemed on the basis of equelity, was in reality conducted in
e way //holly favorable to England." The triangular trade in
more explicit words consisted of an English ship--say in
Boston loading with lumber, flour, or provisions, and sailing
to the ji/est Indies from wnich United Stetes ships were pro-
hibited. There the English ship would teke on e cargo of
suger, rum, or molasses and either go direct to Eigland or
back to Boston where she would dispose of her cargo end take
on a cargo of cotton or woolens for her home country--Englend.
The people in the United Stetes missed the Imports of silks,
muslins, brocades, edged tools, etc., from Europe— likewise
they missed Madeira, coffee, end tea-^ and the demand //hich
arose for them with the cessation of hostilities aided the
Lritish tremendously. As McMaster points out, the demend wes
so great that importers were discarded and sailors end super-
cargoes were auctioning off their cargoes to the highest
bidders in the city streets and as e result fabulous profits
were mede. The British extended credit on terms over $500 to
30, 60, end 90 days, and in some cases more with the resultant
effect the t importers brought too many goods, could not pay for
them, end in most cases after the hysteria hed died down, they
1. McMaster, History of American People p. 322 Vol. IV
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could not sell them.
Such conditions obviously couldn't be toleraoed, and
the demands on Congress to do something finally resulted in
the passage of a general Act, the provisions of which, simply
stated, were the offer to withdraw all discriminating duties
in favor of any foreign nation which did the same thlng--the
President was left ss the judge to decide that the foreign
nation had withdrawn all discriminating or counter-manding
duties which were to the disadvantage of the United States.
1
Only three countries accepted this offer of reciprocity in the
o
direct trade--namely , Great Britain, Sweden, and Algiers.
As a consequence little effect, if any, resulted in the general
trend of trade. The Maritime orovinces; i.e., Nova Scotia,
etc., ho.vever, passed an act which was to bring down the wrath
of Congress upon all foreign countries. This act was the
Plaster of P«ris Act, which placed an export duty of twenty
shillings a ton on plaster, a large article of export, if the
plaster was exported in an American ship. Tnis was the last
straw, end Congress now forbade any foreign ship to bring
plaster into the United States from any port from which Ameri-
can vessels were excluded. 3 Congress was now up in arms
entirely, and as a consequence, another retaliatory measure
was passed; namely, forbidding admission to all British ships
from British ports wherein American vessels were prohibited.
This blow was of course intended primarily to hit the i/tfest
Indies, and now a vigorous commercial war was beg n between
1. Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Freeman Hunt, Editor, Vol. II
2. Marvin, American Merchaxit Marine, p. 179
3. Ibid., p. 177
t
England and the United States. Such a war was bound to be
injurious, and McMaster says-*- "Half the tonnage owned along
the sea-board and engaged in the coasting and foreign trade
was said to have been laid up. In every sea-port ships could
be seen dismantled and literally rotting at the wharves, while
American sailors sought occupation abroad, and American ship-
wrights went off to New Brunswick to cut timber and build
vessels to carry it to Europe or go the Indies. Once more all
branches of trade connected with ship-building languished,
and thousands of Mechanics were thrown out of employment .
"
Trade between the west Indies and the United States was essen-
tial, and so smuggling was very common, and trie authorities
completely disregarded it in order to allow needed articles to
be brought into the country. Smuggling gave the people cheaper
8nd more abundant necessities of life. Marvin^ cites as an
example of the indifference of the customs officials the
example of the Connecticut Senator who sent out a quantity of
candles, which were on the forbidden list, but the people of
the Colony were in need of the candles, so t. clever customs
official classified them as herrings and they passed through.
Congress finally in a conciliatory mood in March,
1817, passed a lew which forbade the importation of goods from
any foreign port, except in American vessels, or vessels of
the country from which the goods came. An important proviso
excepted from this Act the vessels of countries that imposed
no such prohibition against American shipping. Another pro-
1. McMaster, History of American People. Vol. IV. p. 349
2. Marvin, w. L. , American Merchant Marine p. 178
•i
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viso absolutely closed bhe coasting trade of the United States
to foreign vessels, but in reality these foreign ships nad all
along been barred out in effect bv heavy tonnage duties. 1
Hunt gives full details of this Navigation Act of 1817. ^ It
established that after the 30th day of September, 1817, no
vessels or boats engaged in the fisheries should oe entitled
to the bounties a 1 lowed by law, unless the officers and at
least three-fourths of the crew were citizens of the United
States or persons not the subjects of any foreign province or
state. Also, every vessel employed in the coasting trade,
except those going from one state to another adjoining on sea-
coast or navigable river, or from Long Island to the state of
New York to Rhode Island and vice versa should be subject to
a duty of 50 cents per ton, unless three-fourths of the crew
at least were American citizens and not subject to any foreign
province. It was also decided that after that time a duty of
50 cents was to be paid upon every American vessel entering
from a foreign port--unless the officers and at least two-
thirds of the crew should be of the same national character
during the voyage, with the exception of sickness and desertion
In 1818 under the nrovisions of the Navigation Act
of 1817 the discriminating duties against the Netherlands,
Prussia', Hamburg, and Bremen were discontinued, and one by one
treaties of reciprocity have been signed until today we have
treaties of reciprocity with practically every country of the
world.
1. Moloney, Heritage of Tyre. p. 38
a. Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Vol. V. 1841. p. 46
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The various Navigation Acts and Reciprocity agree-
ments are of importance to us, because they tend to show us
why the interest of the people in Massachusetts at this time
was turning from shipping and commercial interests to other
fields. As has been stated before, the (STar of 1812 resulted
in bringing about distressing economic and industrial condi-
tions. Capital and labor had been forced to find new fields
of employment and the people of Massachusetts were no excep-
tions to the rule. As a result, a brisk rise of manufacturing
begun, and this soon readied sucn a high level that by 1840 it
dominated "uhe State. The rise of manufacturing was of course
brought about; because during the war the people were forced to
provide their own necessities of life--for it was practically
impossible to buy any English manufactured goods.
Edward Everett Hale writes that 1 "Homespun industries"
existed in New England and Massachusetts at all times. As he
ooints out, the Yankee ingenuity of the inhabitants prohibited
their calmly accepting as inevitable the decline of shipping
and commerce. If shipoing «=ind commerce were to fail, all well
und good, there were other outlets for their energy, and they
would produce their own necessities. Coupled with this Yankee
ingenuity and determination was the added feature of favorable
physical conditions. If in the early days the forests and
streams had made a turn to ship-building and shipping inevi-
table, then now when power was needed for the newly developed
cotton and woolen mills, the unbridled power of the Merrimac
1. Hale, Edward Everett--The Story of Massachusetts. Boston.
D. Lothrop Company. 22 chapters 354 pages; p. 341
t
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end of the other rivers and streams provided the means by
which the ability to do was carried on. Thus, when previously
the Essex fisherman1 had devoted his spare time to making
boots end shoes in the winter seeson when it was impossible for
him to be et sea, now he devoted full time to his project.
Today the boot end shoe industry is ohe largest one in the
State, I believe. It, of course, was a boon to those smell
towns which were not conveniently situated on rivers, for it
doesn't require as much power es do the machines of the mills.
In the eerly beginnings, too, it was ell done by manual labor,
the same es prectically every housewife in M; ssachusetts mede
the clothes which her family wore.
I have steted that manufacturing reached a real
boom during the jar. This is true, but before the wer, the
various embargoes and decrees had aided it. we must not reach
the conclusion that manufacturing began at this time. Such is
not the case, for in Massachusetts and New England manufactur-
ing began practically as soon as the colonies were founded.
That is to be expected--if the oarren fields and unstable
crops mede a turn to the sea inevi table--they likewise made a
turn to manufacturing inevitable. This wes necessary because
in order to trade with the mother country the colonies needed
staple products and commodities, and since the land was unable
to produce them, the colonists had of necessity to meke them
for themselves. Pitkin gives a fairly good review of the rise
of manufactures and of the attitude of England toward such a
1. Hale, Edward Everett--The Story of Massachusetts. Boston
D. Lothrop Company. 22 chapters. 354 pages; page 345

>rise. As early as 1719 the House of Commons declared "that
the erecting manufactories in the Colonies tended to lessen
their dependence on Great Britain. 1 In 1731 the House of
Commons directed the Board of Trade to inquire and report "with
respect to laws made, manufactures set up, or trade carried on
detrimental to the trade, navigation, or manufactures of
Great Britain. "2 The result of this investigation was a report
which stated that in the colonies north of Virginia and more
especially New England, there were more trades carried on end
factories established than in any of the other of the British
colonies. The Board stated that as a consequence, it would be
well for Great Britain to direct these trades in such a manner
as to produce all kinds of naval stores and products which
would be of material use to tne mother countr;/. As an example
of the types of manufactures carried on in Massachusetts Bay,
we have these quotations from Pitkin. In Massachusetts Bay,
in 1731, "an act was made to encourage the manufacture of
paper, which law interferes with the profit made by the British
merchant, on foreign paper sent thither."^ To quote again
from Pitkin, "The Governor of Massachusetts Bay informed us
that in some parts of this province, the inhabitants worked up
their wool end flax into an ordinar;/ coarse cloth for their
own use, but did not export any. That the greatest part of the
woolen and linen clothing worn in this province was imported
from Great Britain, and sometimes from Ireland; but considering
the excessive price of labor in New England, the merchant
1. Pitkin, Timothy A Statistical View of the Commerce of the
United States of America. New Haven 1835 13 chps . 596pp.
p. 461
2. ibid. p. 462 3. ibid, u.462
<1
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could afford whet wes imported cheeper then whet was mede in
the country. There were elso a few hat -makers in the maritime
towns, end the greeter pert of the leether used in thet
country was manufactured among themselves. Thet there hed
been for many veers some iron works in that province which hed
efforded the people iron for some of their necessary occesions,
but thet the iron imported from Greet Britain was esteemed
much the best, end wholly used by the shipping, and that the
iron works of the province were not able to supply the
twentieth pert of whet wes necessery for the use of the
country . The Massachusetts Bay colony Assembly elso voted
e bounty of thirty shillings for every piece of duck or can-
vass made in the colon;/; also there wes mede in the colony
smell quentities of cloth mede of linen end cotton, brown
nolle nd, e material used for 'women's clothes, thus preventing
the importation of calicoes.^ There were elso woolen faotories
nail forges, and furneces for cest or hollow were. A cotton
factory wes esteblished in Beverly in 17 90.
The above quotations end paragraph shows without
further comnent, I believe, the state of manufecture as it
existed in Messachusetts • It is little wonder thet despite
the efforts of the British government to curteil manufacture
before the Revolution, end the efforts of Hamilton to aid in
protecting and encoureging it, thet when necessity arose due
to the Embargo and the war of 1812, menufacturing had e brisk
rise. The profits were good, the demand great, end it wes not
1. Pitkin, Statistical View p. 463
ibid. p. 464
i1
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until after the conclusion of the war and the flooding of
European goods, especially English, and the inability of Amer-
ican manufacturers to compete with the old established English
industries, the capital, skilled labor, lower wages, 1 that
recognition of aiding manufactures by e tariff was considered.
Pitkin quotes fi \ures which show the amounts of imports as
p
f gainst the exports for 1815 and 1816. The period between
January and October, 1815, the value of the imports was
#83,080,073, and from October 1, 1815, to October 1, 1816, the
value of imports increased to the almost fabulous amount of
$155,302,700, of whicn the value paying ad valorem duties
amounted to more than $100,000,000, approximately $70,000,000
of which was on v.oolens and cottons. The value of the exports
for 1815-1816 was only $134,478,205. Hart in his Commonwealth
History of Massachusetts states that business and economic
conditions were good in the state during the war, and that
despite the hostile attitude of the state toward the war, it
benefitted greatly. For example, manufactured goods were sent
south in large quantities and in return large amounts of
specie were Drought back: due to the impossibility of trans-
oorting the bul^y goods of the Soutn overland. At the
session of the Massachusetts General Court, January, 1815,
twenty-four companies were incorporated for the manufacture of
woolen or cotton cloths, ^ with a majority of the latter. It
was the policy of the General Court to give all the encourage-
ment it could to the development of domestic manufactures. On
TT whisor, Justin Memorial History of Boston 1630-1880
4 vols. Boston Ticknor and Company 1880 Vol. IV p. 71
2. Pitkin, Statistical View. p. 474
3. Bradford, History of Massachusetts Vol. 3 p. 231
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October 16, 1815, a committee of the town council^" reported
that the town of Boston should grant or have power to grant
suitable privileges and immunities to associations of
Mechanics, Artificers, or Manufacturers within the to.vn. The
power of such council would of course be regulated by the Con-
stitution end laws of the State and could only effect those
who voluntarily associate togeLner. One of the greet ret sons,
too, why manufacturing increased n&s in the nuge increase in
popula tioni6--demand now far exceeded supply, end the commerciel
warfare between this country and England prevented an adequate
amount of goods to be imported; as e consequence
,
manufacturing
wes bound to spring an Su the expense of shipping.
The increase of populetion, while a big factor in the
development of manufacturing, also wes an added feature to
the opening of the new lands in the west. The poor ship-
owners sew ports--as Salem and Beverly, prostrated by the war,
8nd the lerge ship-owning families were moving from the minor
ports to Boston. It was at this period thet Boston began its
big rece to beat New York as the principal sea-port, and two
of the factors in its downfall were the opening of the new
lands in the West and the increase in population, and the
flow of populetion to the new lends. New York had the huge
advantage of being favorably situated not only on the sea, but
also as regards favorable position near the inland weterways
and trails. Consequently, the manufacturing interests were
becoming predominant in New York state, end th.se manufac-
1. Boston Town Records 1814-1822 37th Report Boston p. 44
H. Callender, Guy Stevens Economic History of the United
States 1765-1860 Boston 1909 15 chapters 817 pp. p. 433

turers much ageinst the protest end dismay of the ship-owner
s
becked the teriff of 1816. It is a rether ironic fact thet
most of the great manufacturers had received their money
through their shipping interests end now heedless of that feet,
they began to pass acts which would strengthen and protect
menufacturing.
The teriff of 1816 wes opposed, and none other than
Daniel Webster steted against the teriff that it ;as against
Stetes Rights--a position which a few years leter he wes to
chenge completely. His chief argument egainst the teriff wes
that it would work e hardship on the shipping interests by
increasing the price of ship-building material.-'- Also, the
people of New England feared that it would result in a
decrease in imports, end es e consequence hurt Americen
shipping. The manufacturers, on the other hend, a majority of
whom hed undoubtedly been recruited from the shipping renks,
demanded protection. Their money was now invested in factories,
end they couldn't return to shipping without becoming involved
in a world-wide competition. The tariff of 1816 was essen-
tially one of protection--its features were^--imposed a duty
of 25 per cent ad valorem on cotton and woolen goods until
1819 when the duty would be reduced to 20 per cent; a duty of
35 per cent wes pieced on articles which could be mcde et
home (thus prohibitory). In respect to cottons, however, it
was provided that all cotton cloths, the originel cost of
which wes less ti an 25 cents per square yard, should be deemed
1» Gerner, Jemes W. Lodge, Henry Cabot History of the
United Stetes. Philadelphia 1906 4 Vols. Vol 2 p. 796
H. ibid. p. 769
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to have cost that much and pay duties accordingly—this was an
establishment of the minimum principle whose real object at
the time was to prevent the sale of East Indian coarse cloth
in the American market. 1 There was a permanent duty of 50
per cent ad valorem placed on various other articles, such as
hats, cabinet wares, and all manufactures of wood, carriages
of all descriptions, leather, and all manufactures of leather,
and paper of every description. To aid and encourage the
manufacture of domestic sugar, a specific duty of three cents
per pound was laid on all imported brown sugar. 2 a duty of 20
per cent ad valorem was pieced on those articles which could
not be produced at home. The fishing industry was helped by
the tariff, for it placed a duty of one dollar per quintal on
foreign-caught mackerel, and also similar duties were placed
on other fish. As may be seen, however, the tariff was one
essentially of protection, for the manufacturing interests,
and consequently it is important to us, for it shows the way
the wind was blowing.
In this chapter, I hava discussed the advent of.
oeace, the depression which followed it, the commercial war-
fare between England and the United States, with England's
selfish desire or in a way natural desire to secure zhe
majority of the trade for her own ships. I have discussed,
likewise, the rise of new conditions--i . e . new lands, growth
of population, growth or rather sudden development of manu-
facture with its result and effect on the 'tariff question. In
1. Pitkin Statistical View p. 475
2. ibid. p. 475
3. Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts Vol. Ill p. 545
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the following chapter, I will endeavor to bring more closely
together these various facts .vith their direct result on the
State of Massachusetts in general.
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CHAPTER V
COMMERCE OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1803 to 1820
«s shown by table
The chart which I am using here is mtde up of quo-
tations from different tables presented in different books.
One notable exception is to be found, and that is, I hi ve no
mention of imports. There is a reason for this--namely
,
up
until about 1820 the United States government and the various
states concerned themselves little with keeping a record of
imports. One can find figures for the imports which were msde
into the United States through all the various ports and states
but up until 1820 these figures are all more or less guess-
work to my way of thinking-. Also, when once the government
did begin to mske a record of imports there arose the question
as to how the value of the goods should be arrived at. Should
it be the value or price which they brought in their own
countries when sold, or should it be the value or price--say
the real price which they brought in this country. As a con-
sequence, the question of imports, although important, is a
difficult one. As one may notice in the chart I have figures
showing the duties collected on foreign merchandise imported
into Massachusetts end Che drawback on foreign merchandise.
Hunt quoted these figures, and I feel that it is well to
accept them at their face value, and one can determine fairly
accurately the value of the total imports from these figures.
Thet is to say, duties were collected on goods paving 27-|, 32^-,
II
•
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and 42|: per cent duties ad valorem. Thus, if we make a general
( verage of these duties, we would arrive at 34. We could say
then, that all the goods imported paid en average of 34 per
cent duties ed valorem, or to make it easier, saying 1/3 of
value. Wenn we say ad valorem, we mean according to the value
es set forth by the owners when declaring their shipment.
Suppose now, for example, we take the year 1806; the duties on
foreign merchandise imported equaled $6,209,725. We must
deduct from this $2, 479, 026 the drawback— for a drawback con-
tains the money which is returned to the importer when goods
on which they htve paid a duty ere sent back to foreign
countries. If we deduct the drawback, we arrive at a figure
of $3,730,699, the net duties on foreign goods imported.
Taking our average duty of say 1/3, we could arrive at a figure
of $11,192,097 as the net value of all imports into Massachu-
setts during that year. In order to dtermine the full amount
of import s--i . e
.
, the gross value, we would simply multiply
the duties on merchandise imported by 1/3 and obtain $18,629,17
Thus we would arrive at a rough estimate of the full amount of
all imports carried into Massachusetts during the year.
The gross value of imports were less than the total
exDorts in 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809, 1810, and 1811; while
the net value of imports were more than the total value of
exports in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, and 1816. When the imports
exceed the exports, it means the balance of trade is against
us. The net V8lue of imports then gives us, it seems to me, a
5.

more accurate picture of how our trade urea affected. It
would be interesting to know just what percentage of the
exoorts had already been imported--i . e
.
, West Indies, etc?
Consequently since we can't determine just the exact; amount,
it renders our figures a little more inexact. In the previous
chapters, we have discussed the many things which affected our
commerce; i.e., Treaty of Amiens signed in 1802, end its
resultant decline of the carrying trade; English revival of the
Rule of 1756 in 1805; Berlin decree in 1806; Milan decree, 1807
British orders in Council, 1807; Jefferson and Embargo, 1807-
1808; Non-Intercourse Act, 1808; and the War of 1812.
From 1803 to 1807 the values of exports and imports
increased due to the treaty of Amiens, 1802, and also due to
renewal of war between England and France resulting in all
countries involved practically, except the United States. In
1807 due to the Orders in Council, and the beginning of
Embargo, there was a slight drop, but not a too alarming one.
Even the registered tonnage in Massachusetts kept increasing
during this period. In 1808, there was a huge drop in exports
and imports due to the Embargo. This drop was due more to the
fact that the effects of the Embargo were felt more during the
following year, for when the Embargo was declared, many ships
were in Europe and returned with cargoes, thus causing only a
small slump in 1807, but a huge one in 1808. When the Non-
Intercourse Act was declared, it also aided the huge slump,
because it forbade trade with two of our biggest consumers--

• = , —
Franco end England. The drop in registered tonnage in 1808 is
probably due to the fact that many of the merchants preferred
to put their vessels in dry-dock instead of registering them
and letting them rot in che water. From 1809 through 1811
recovery is apparent, but not in any sense of terms as in the
years 1803 through 1807. The cause for this is to be found
in the fsct that England and France, although not at peace,
were resuming their own carrying trade, and as a consequence,
our shipping was not in such huge demand. The drop in regis-
tered tonnt ge in 1811 is said by Marvin-^- to have been caused
by the treacherous seizures of Napoleon of American vessels.
Marvin also claims that the small figures in 1810-1803 were due
to the work of the Barbary pirates. From 1812 through 1815
there is a huge drop--especie lly in 1813-1814, due to the War
with England. This drop was a result, of course, of Non-
Intercourse as passed by Madison, and also the drop in tonnage
is due to the capture of American vessels by the English.
Revival is evident from 1816 through 1820, but this is only
slight. The figures show how our markets were swamped with
foreign goods after the war. Also, as we may notice, the
figures show that registered tonnage is decreasing rapidly.
This is due to several facts; i.e., after the war, the names
of many vessels registered were stricken from the lists due
to the fact that they had been lost at sea, captured, or sold;
also it shows the change from shipping to manufactures. From
the figures, too, we may deduce the fact through the net value
1. Marvin, Old Merchant Marine p. 131

--fig- -
of imports that trade from 1812 to 1816 was favorable toward
other countries and that after that it was more even, due
oossibly to the Tariff of 1816 and the Navigation Act of 1817.
Niles quotes some figures which are interesting
about arrival of American and foreign vessels in .various ports.
In 1816 the number of foreign vessels to arrive in Boston were
167; the number of Americans, 489--raaking a total of 656. In
New York, the number was 1172--of which 403 were foreign, and
769 American. The arrival of coastwise vessels during the
same year were 1684 in Boston and 1812 in New Yor r . The Regis-
tered tonnage enrolled in New York in 1015 was 299,617,70,
while that in Boston was 143,420 .25--showing that New York's
was almost double Boston' s.l The arrivals and clearances for
the year 1817 in Boston were 775 vessels arrived and (385
cleared. 1690 coastwise vessels arrived and 1994 cleared.^
These figures do not include vessels with lumber, for they were
not required to enter^ or clear.- They were estimated at 2,000,
however, making a grand total of 7103 arrivals in 1817.
The table showing the exports of Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina is interesting, for it
shows that the expurt trade of New York was more in every year
except 1804 and 1814. Pennsylvania's was more in 1813, as was
South Carolina's due undoubtedly to the war. In 1815 and 1816
Soutr Carolin's was more due probably to the rise of direct
trade with cotton.
1. Niles weekly Register Vol. XIII p. 368
2. ibid. Vol. XII p. 253

o
C\2
CO
rH
I
to
o
CO
CQ
Eh
«O
ft
P d
CO O
•H rH
CD d
CO
O CD
CD Pi CO
O d^3
CO
PiQ
O CD d
CO CD
CO
-P
CD 3 Pi
O
Pj
o a
•H
P
a
PI «M -H
O
CD
CO d
CO rH
O CO
C5
O
i
W rH
-P CO
PlP
a ©
H CD
CO dP H
O CO
O d
5q
d CD
rH Pi
CO O
> P>H
O -HP
(0
CO o
Pi
<0
CD
>H
rHC>CV2r>0>rHCDWO>OCOlOinc'3t0^t<J'q'
COC^tOCD^a>OCOCOC\3COOCOtDCOrHO>rH
^COCSCOOiOJOtDlficDl^^OOOJOtOOiH
Cl)C0CDC^OrH0>O^r>"^tNa>^rHC0t0lO
O«0t0OC0in«DC0W0>«0C>C\3OCQCDWCv3
^OlOtDOtO-st1 CVltO«OOLOC7»'*COCV2tDO
CV2tOCOOiHtDWiOt>-«DtOCV2aJt> ^OOCO
<MWCv2tOtOCv2COcOWWCMCUCViCV2CV2rHrHrH
C>"^H«DWCV2lOCX)OeaCOO>lOCV2CX)t>C\]lO
OC-T#WC\2<^OCOO©tOO>0-Cv20CXWCO(DOOO(DWrl^'=l, <ONW(OW^O(DH
L0WaJ0>OL0C0O?DH«D ,^»H^OC0CV2O
inc^^C>COO>LDlOHinOCV2C>CQC\2COO>t>
rH <M 02 CV3
OLOOlOmOWrH^OtOOrHCOlOOWrHiHrHcQWWrHOC^tNCOWCOrH^OirHW^D
tO^COC>^C^lOtOOa>C>lOC\!cOtOCOOC\2
OrHlNO>r-WC>-rHC\2cOOC\2 • -j' O t> tO rH CO
rHOtDOOOicQiOO-OOiO^^^HH"^^
^^C^WCOCUtOO>r>rHO^a>a>C\2Cnc>rH
HlOOlOlOH(OtOWOO>OCQC»inH(DWlOs^OiC^OLOOrHWOtD^CQWCOlOtDCO
COC\ia>rHWlOlOO<Ml>-rHO-?DOOa>Ot>-
H^HC^^^C\2tOtOHWc>CV2Cv2cOCOcOa>
CQOOCV2rHCDrHlOrHWOl>-tOsl<lO^C\2CV2
WC\2CO^rHCOO>COtOlOCv3^COCO«Ot>W^
OiOC-CO<^^C>rHCOO»tO'*C>-t>CV2^^W
rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
OcOtNtNO>lOHO>CU'tfintOCOtOHOOCO
CMoatOOiOWai^lO^tO-^OtOtOCJi^C"-
CDOCOO^^rHiot>-c>-coa>tococo<oioco
^co^wwcoooeOtOtococOt>a>o^ -j ( o>
cOCDinoiO>COl<DO<0«OiOOHCOlS(D^H
OrHOrHrH^^OOlOCOm^tN-^aiWOCO
r-\ r-\ r-{ rH rH H rH
tOC0C^COlOWtOc0lPC0cOa>EOa>t><OCOC\2
lOfcQtDC\2rHCOWO"^CQO»c>-0'^0>rHa>0>
C0^OC^W(DWc0^cOt>C0Ot0r>C0a>C0
«DO>WO>HW^HtOCOOHCOCONo>£00OC0^HHrHrHOWlOC0rHWH0>0>C0O
CO tDOJHOlOWrtHtOHHlOOHHHHHHWW H H H HHrlHH
t0^tOr>t>O^CNOO><tfC\20tOrHOrHt>-
^mo-^ooitoo-woLOWWcooiocvico
LOWtOlOCOtOlOWCDrHaDC^tO^lOrHOW
C^rH(DC^tOO>C»HWaD'^lOC\2t>0>0>lOC>
COiOMOCn^OHWHtOW OrHCOWlOrH
rH lO tO tO tO t>
O W rH tD CO CM a» H
O rH O tO O <£> O O- towoo^cn^«oo>^
cn co o rH 10 en m H
CO CO tO tO rH^ O O
WIOCOCOOCOCOCOCOH
^COtOO^OOOiO-tO0»HOlOOO)(OCOa3
lO tO tO tO tO^ tOlOtOtOrHHCOiOLOlO^CO
CO^lOtOOQOcnOrHWcO^mtOOCOOsOOOOOOOOHrlHHHHHHHHW
cocococococococococococococococococo
r*rHrHr-*r-ir-\r-ir-\rHr-\r4r-ir-ir-\r-lr-ir-irH
rH
CO to
o a>
•H rHP •
CO ft
•Hp d
co e=1p co
CO H
CO CO
CJ rH
•H •
^ ft
P
•H •
CD
d
•H
tO
o a
CM
• P
ft C
I
o> o
C\2 (H
CO CD
rHJ
CO
o
•H
Pi
CD
a
rH
O
CO
J*
O
CO
&
CO
JH
nd
•a
CO
10
CD
•H
P
dd
CD
•H
c
CD
>
•H
to
CO
CD
Pi
d
•H
a
o
Pi
CD •
d d
•H -rH rH
N > CD
CO Pi CO
d >»
d p
d co
co »d
xi • CDO Vl rH
Pi to •H
CD tO ft3 • a
Ph o
CO O
w •
P CO CO
d •
dto t
M o
.
q-i p
a o a
o •H
U CD
«M O d
Pi od CD
<d a CO
rH a^ CD
•rH O U
ftO d
a cjD
•H
o o
• •
rH CM

Vsluo of Exports of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Caroline, 1805-1820
.
1
Year Massachusetts New York Pennsylvania South Csroli
1803 8,768,566 "ft j>-V /"X ft / -ft «M10,818,387 7 ,525 ,710 7,811,108
1804 16 ,894 , 378 "1 /-» (--ft
-« /~\ f-1 i16 ,081,281 -J -1 y—\ r-? /-ft T (— f-j11,030, 157 7,451,616
1805 19,435, 657 23,482,943 I « »— /» /—\ /—ft i— /~v13,762,252 9,066,625
1806 21,199,243 21,762,845 17 ,574 ,702 9,743,782
1807 20,112,125 26,357 ,963 —I j-% ,—\ ft yt >« A A16 ,864,744 10,912,564
1808 5, 128,322 5 ,666 ,058 4,013,330 1,664,445
1809 12, 142,293 12 ,581,562 y—V 4 /—ft /^
»
-ft9,049,241 3,247,341
1810 13,013,048 17,242,330 ~t \ /-N /—ft f7 r"7 /—ft /—ft10,993,398 / /—ft y—v yr»i ."ft ^ jl5,290,614
183
1
-ft ^ y""ft 1— A /•% I
—
11,235,465 -1 / -ft /""ft r"» /-» /—ft T j—12,2o6,215 /-ft r— >^ /—» t "I H9,560 , 117 A /—ft /»» ^ /—V y—ft4,861,279
1812 6,583,338 8,961,922 5,937,750 2,036, 195
1813 1,807 , 923 8, 185,494 3, 577 , 177 /-"ft /—ft /-» /"*ft /• /-\ /]2, 968,484
1814 1, 133,799 209,670 Y~i T Yt f~\ S~\ /—ft737 ,899
1815 5,280,083 10,675,373 4,593,919 6,675,129
1816 10,136,439 19,690,031 7,196,246 10,849,409
1817 11,927,997 18,707,4^3 3,735,592 10,372,615
1818 11,998,156 17,872,261 8,759,402 11,440,962
1819 11,399,913 13,587,378 6,293,788 8,250,790
1820 11,008,922 13,163,244 5,743,579 8,882,940
1. Pitkin--Statistical View pp. 50, 51, 52, 57
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION—SUMMARY of I
Conditions in Massachusetts, 1815-1820.
The prosperity of Massachusetts during the war was
due almost entirely to the growth of manufactures. This is
of course borne out "by our chart which shows growtn of
commerce 1802-1820. There was a decline in exports, in im-
ports and shipping was practically prostrate in 1813-1814,
In 1814; i.e., January—manufactures were estimated to have
grown to a value of fifteen to twenty millions a year.-*- The
great growth of manufactures and the sale of them to the
South resulted in the drawing of a half a million dollars
a month from the banks of the South in payment for them.^
Money was a drug and the banks were at their wit ends to
know how to lend it. 3 The following figures show this in-
creasing control of all specie by Massachusetts banks. In
1809 tne banks of Massachusetts held only $820,000 in specie.
It was estimated that by the middle of the year 1814
Massachusetts banks held nearly $7, 000, 000 in specie. The
banking capital of the entire country was only one-third greate: 1
than Massachusetts or in other words the Massachusetts banks
controlled for the most part by Federalists controlled one-
third of the entire capital of the country.^ Wiles gives
the following report on finances of Massachusetts given
June 7, 1816. The public debt; i.e., stock, funded debt, and
1. Adams, J.T., New England in Republic. p,284
2. Ibid.
, p. 284
3. Adams, Henry, History of U.S. Vol. VIII. q.15
4. Ibid., Vol. VII.p.387ff.
5. Niles Weekly Register. Hezakiah lUles, Editor Vol.X. p. 312
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1
loans—amounted to ft ,525 ,313.51 ; Stocks belonging to the Com-
monwealth amounted to #1,668,354.74; property belonging- to
tne Commonwealth $105,447.59; the annual revenues of Massachu-
setts equaled $306,333.35. ThesA figures give us a bare
glimpse of the conditions in the state at trie time and show
that the state at that time was in good financial condition.
Massachusetts at first did not feel the adverse
change in conditions because it depended on its shipping for
the source of its profits and at this time the growth of
manufactures aided shipping by using vessels to send goods
abroad. As a consequence when peace was declared tnere were
huge cargoes of manufactured articles and products of the last
two Harvests. Soon, however, foreign vessels in tne naroors an
now tne old rates of profit were at an end; American vessels
»
were meeting competition. The manufactures which had aided
our shipping now experienced a decline. Adams-*- gives as his
reason for this the following: the United States poured domes-
tic produce worth 50 millions into England, and England re-
taliated by pouring 40 millions of imports into the U.S. and
as a consequence the American market was inundated with
manufactures which although they paid duties o£ 25^ were sold
at prices which ruined American competition. The sale of tne
rich cargoes of vessels captured by the Americans brought
money and buyers into ^*ew England but with the decline of
manufactures and Parliament's placement of a duty on lumber in
1815 ruined not only shipping but also lumber trade.
1. Adams, Henry—History of U.S. Vol. 9 p. 95-96
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It is of some interest to quote Here from Niles. 1
A letter written to iUles says that the commerce of New England,
and more especially Massachusetts and Boston was bound to drop
to tne cessation of the War in Rurope, unless canals, roads,
etc., were built to keep trade away from its natural emporium;
i.e., New York. The Federalists are blamed for the ruin of
manufactures after the war because they favored peace at any
cost. Afain he (the writer) claims and justly that the
people of tne country will not soon forget the attitude of
the people of Massachusetts (in the Federalists, not al.1 people)
during the war. This attitude of Massachusetts is going to
be against the best interests of Boston, for Boston depends for
commerce upon the agriculture of the Southern States; i.e.,
commerce of the Eastern states built upon an intercourse with
the Southern. The merchants of Boston derived about 3/5 of
their commodities for exports from the Soutxiern States. Tne
writer goes on to point out that due to these facts and the
condition of war in Europe the merchants of Boston succeeded
in extending trade to all portions of the world and gathered
their wealth in cash, or in commodities which came to the
Soutiiern States, thus furnishing new supplies for trade in
continuous procession. The writer has many fine ideas in
his letter as will be well brought out in the next paragraph.
The change from prosperity to adversity can be
found by the following: emigration was to tne Mohawk Valley
and Western New York stat4 and was caused I think to the fact
1. IUles Weekly Register. March-September 181 b. Vol. VIII
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raany people in Massachusetts were tillers of the soil at
heart and when the broad, fertile plains of the Liohawk, etc.,
were opened to them they siezed the opportunity to go there
and escape the harsh climate and poor soil of Massachusetts.
Adams, says that in 1814, January, the Massachusetts banks
held about $7,300,000 in specie and that with the advent of
peace in 1815; i.e., January and February, they probably held
more, as the causes, i.e., growth of manufactures, which
led to trie influx were not removed. In June, 1815, the
Massachusetts banks held only $5,464,000 and the drain on thei:
specie continued until in June, 1816, the amount of specie
was reduced to $1,260,000. The attitude of the Federal
government toward New England and more especially Massachusetts
is well reflected by the Treasury. 2 The banks in New England
were the only ones able to make specie payments and the
Treasury although it collected in Treasury notes and notes of
local banks (all equivalent to specie) accepted elsewhere
local notes at depreciation. To make matters still worse the
Treasury made the creditors in New England, take payment in
whatever specie it nad on hand, while elsewhere it paid off
with what it collected. Thus, banks of Massachusetts and
New England were paying off their debts in full, while the
rest of the country was paying off their debts in local money
(i.e., state notes, bank notes, etc.) which was valued less
than specie. Also Massachusetts and New England paid debts
with specie of par value and received payment of debts owed to
them in money often below par.
1. Adams, Henry.- History of U.S. Vol. 9. p. 97-98
2. Ibid., p. 97-98
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Henry Adams1 gives still more figures on the wealth
of Massachusetts. The increase of the wealth was really sur-
prising. In 1803 Massachusetts had seven banks with a capital
of $2,225,000 and deposits of $1,500,000, In June 1816
Massachusetts had twenty-five banks with a capital of #ll,500,0b0
and deposits of 2,123,000. This small increase in deposits was
due to the decline of shipping and manufactures, also due to
drain of specie that followed peace, but the capital had in-
creased almost five times. There were too many banks, however,
for the capital began to decrease so that in 1817 it was down
to 9,300,000 a decline of almost 30$. Tne increase in capital
though from 1803 to 1816 or more especially say from 1808-
1816 is due probably to manufactures for the imports show
little increase. In 1803 the debts to the banks amounted to
$3,850,000 while in June 1817 tney amounted to $12,650,000.
The gross amount of duties collected in 1800 were less than
3,200,000 while the gross amount in 1816 was more than
6,100,000—the duties therefore had not quite doubled in 16
years and tne Embargo and war is undoubtedly responsible.
The exports of domestic produce of Massachusetts in 1803 were
valued at $5, 400,000 while in 1816 they were valued at
$5,008,000 2 showing once again tne decline and also bringing
out tne fact I believe that exports of foreign origin were
those which really did more to help our trade and this of
course was due to our position of neutrality. The total tonnage
registered in Massachusetts for foreign trade in 1800 was
1. Adams, Henry. History of U.S. Vol. IX. p. 158
2. Pitkin, Statistical View of Commerce, pp. 55-56

211,000 tons, in 1816 it was 274,000 tons; wnile tonnage
registered for coasting trade was 75,000 tons in 1800 and
129,000 in 1816.
Another factor in the decline was that although the
population was increasing, it was increasing far less in
proportion to the increase in the Middle States and the West
States. For example, the South and New England contained about
l/2 population of country; yet from 1800-1820 its population
increased as 100 to 129 in them; 100 to 192 in Middle States,
and 100 to 423 i^ Western States. ^ Thus, wealth was increasing
more than population, but despite this manufacturing was
prostrate, shipping "being driven from the carrying trade, and
the State despised because of its war policy and the Hartford
convention. Immigration might have helped but did not because
the immigrants tended to stay where they landed. There were
22,000 immigrants in 1817 and they arrived in Boston to about
a number of 2,000, 7,000 in New York and 7,000 in Philadelphia.
It wasn't until the high tide of immigration tnat Boston,
Massachusetts and New England picked up.
One feature which aided in the decline of shipping
as I have discussed; i.e., sailing vessels, long voyages, etc.,
was tne growth of the clippers, packets, and steam ships. I
intend to make only a brief mention of these—only to show how
the trend was going—for with the packet and clippers many
glorious voyages were made; but they presaged steam and with
steam England began to control tae carrying trade. The
1. Adams, Henry. History of U.S. Vol. 9. p.l54-ls5
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Chesapeake or Baltimore clippers were made to the demand for
larger, better, and faster vessels. They ranged in size from
75 to 200 tons and in length from 60 to 125 feet, never carried
more than two masts, and were low and rakish in appearance.
They received their name from the regional, American use of the
intransitive verb "to clip" used in the sense of adjective
showing a description of unusual speech or quickness—thus
"to clip"—"to move swiftly."^ They first appeared in
Baltimore where because of their unusual speed they were used
in the forbidden West Indies trade. The packet ships had
their origin in 1816 when the famous Black Ball line between
New York and Liverpool began operations. In 1822 a second
line to Liverpool was formed and in 1823 a third line to Hull
was formed. The packets were the predecessors of the steam
lines; they had fixed sailing days and arrived and sailed with
great regularity. They were larger and better than the mer-
chant vessels, strong of hull, with a moderate height of
spars and breadth of canvas, but were not built too much for
speed. ^ They carried the higher cost cargoes which could
afford to pay higher freight charges and also there were
provisions made for cabin and steerage passengers. The cap-
tains were exceedingly skilled and reduced the dangers and
terms of a passage from one to tnree months, to one of
comparative luxury and a definite number of days; i.e., 14
to 20. The steamship Savannah left its home port, Savannah,
Georgia on May, 26, 1819 and went across to Liverpool in
1. Meloney. Heritage of Tyre. p. 28
2. Marvin. American Merchant Marine, p.187
3. Maloney. Heritage of Tyre. p.£9ff.
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25 days arriving there June 20. On 18 of the 25 days steam
was used. It had been designed for the Atlantic packet servic
built in Mew York and of little more than 300 tons. She
possessed paddle wheels of iron wings, which could be taken
off in stormy weather and she was well provided with sails,
for she only used her engine when the wind was light or ahead.
This trip with the use of steam pressaged the change which cou3|d
be expected and for that season is notable.
So we come to the conclusion—shipping was to reach
great heights in Massachusetts in the 1820 's, 1820' s and its
clipper ships were going to establish records and feats whicn
will never live down. The period wnich I studied established
the beginnings; it gave to Massachusetts commerce that spirit
which carried it to its glory. I hope I have shown how this w4s
done and also I hope I have brought out the troubles which it
underwent especially from 181o through 1820. It was a period
which was unique—it achieved its glory through hardships,
privation, want, and above all an unquenchable spirit which
was embodied in its merchants and sailors. To them all praise
should be given and I think Mori son does so in the following
lines:
2
Sea Captains young or old, and the mates, and. ... intrepid
sailors
Pick's sparingly without noise by thee, old ocean, chosen
by thee; ....
Suckled by thee, old husky nurse, embodying thee,
Indomitable, untamed as t.iee 1 .
1. Marvin. American Merchant Marine. p.l84~18b
2. Morison, S.S. Maritime History of Massachusetts p. 371
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On July 4, 1789, the Congress of the United States
passed t:ie first law which aided shipping. This aid was
rendered by favoring American owned vessels, vessels owned by
Americans but built abroad, etc., against foreign owned vessels.
As a consequence American registered tonnage tendered to in-
crease with occasional slumps up until 1300. In 1801 the
Pea.ce of Amiens was declared by England and France, only to be
followed by the Napoleonic wars which involved all of Europe.
As a consequence the United States in its position of being
practically the only neutral power received most all of the
carrying trade. The result was a booming of American fishing
which lasted until the Revival of tne Rule of 1756 by England;
i.e., neutrals carry on no trade which they had not carried on
in time of peace. Soon followed the Berlin and Milan decrees
and the British Orders in Council all aimed to prevent neutrals
carrying on trade with the enemy. Trade was hurt, but not
seriously until Jefferson in 1807 issued his famous Embargo
which supposedly forced all American ships to remain at home.
In 1808 due to the tremendous protest raised against the
Embargo, the Won-Intercourse Act was substituted. This revivec.
shipping somewhat but both England and France continued to
seize American vessels and as a result in 1812 war with Great
Britain became a reality.
The people of Massachusetts in the bare majority were
against the war and their hostility toward it is reflected
L*
C sJ 90%* «$50i-. ifilffc flw
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through the trade carried on with tne enemy. Another side of
the story is to be found in the support which was given by
Massachusetts to it through enlistments and contributions.
The war had many ill effects on Massacnusetts. It caused a.
decline of shipping through the loss of foreign markets,
decline of prices and the resumption by European nations of
their own carrying trade. As a result we undergo a period
in the National Government when to revive commerce, reciprocity
is agreed to between England and the United States. This was i.ot
favorable to the United States and finally the Navigation Act
of 1817 is passed. This once again favors United States
vessels were not allowed. This was followed by a general
reciprocity Act which amounted to little.
One feature of the war was t.aat it caused a huge xisk
in the growth of manufactures and this growth was in the beginn-
ing at least helpful to shipping. The decline of shipping in-
directly aided tne growth of manufactures; i.e., mercnants
turned to manufacturing, but the growth of manufactures kept
shipping from going down-hill steadily. Manufacturing tended
to increa.se due to the closing by the Embargo of foreign
imports, to the demand during the war for goods and articles
which previously had been made in Europe, to tne increase in
population, and to the Yankee ingenuity and favorable physical
and climactic conditions. Soon followed to the tariff of 1816
which aided manufacturing and which was supported by the
people of New England as a whole.
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The conditions in Massachusetts right after the war are
first prosperity and then decline. The decline is the result
of a growth in population less than that of other states, a
diminishing of capital in the banks, a rapid flow of emigration
toward the West and tne unfavorable attitude of the country as
a whole against Massachusetts. This attitude while unfair was
at least one which was to be expected due to the way the war
was supported in Massachusetts. Then, too, the advent of
clippers and packets, and steam meant that tne glorious days
were to go—only to be followed later by days that were
glorious in themselves, but to my mind not quite as wonderful.
Trade during this period was carried on all over
the world— to Europe, Canton, the South Sea Islands, and Seal-
islands. The Canton trade—where in its triangular aspects
the vessels first went to the Northwest coast, exchanged trinke
for the skins of tne sea-otter, tnen to the Hawaiis for sandal-
wood, exchanging firearms and muskets, or perhaps to the island^
of the South Seas where beche de mer was the big attraction.
Finally arriving in Canton where the fur-otter skins, sandal-
wood, beche-de-mer , and seal skins from seal islands v/ere ex-
changed for teas, nan-keens, silks, etc. Trade also was carried
on with tne West Indies and South Am erica and these too had
their adventurous aspects. Tne merchants and drews had a spiri - ,
embodied in them which enabled them to carry on such hazardous
voyages and with the decline of tne sailing vessels tne great
saga of Massachusetts history on the sea dies.
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